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I. INTRODUCTION

Medical malpractice liability jury awards have soared in recent years
and have contributed to a serious health care crisis: costs of care are
increasing while the availability and quality of care are decreasing.1
From 1997 to 2006, the median jury award in medical malpractice cases
1. AM. MED. ASSOC., MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM-NOW! 3-7 (2008), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/mlr-now.pdf [hereinafter REFORM NOW); see also
Act of Aug. 25, 2005, Pub. Act 94-677, 2005 Ill. Laws 4964, invalidated by Lebron v. Gottlieb
Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010); infra notes 4-5 (describing the increasing cost of
medical malpractice liability and the challenges that such costs impose on the health care system).
The cost of health insurance has made it impossible or impracticable for millions of Americans to
purchase insurance. Zachary J. Houghton, Treating America's Ailing HealthcareSystem: Is the
Illinois Covered Act a Panaceafor America's UninsuredPoor?, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 759, 765

(2009). In 2006, forty-seven million Americans did not have insurance for the entire year. Id. At
the same time, many doctors are facing serious financial problems that threaten their ability to
practice. Parija Kavilanz, Doctors Going Broke, CNNMONEY (Jan. 5 2012), http://money.
cnn.com/2012/01/05/smallbusiness/doctors-broke/index.htm?hpt-hpt3&hpt-hpcl.
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in the United States more than tripled, swelling from $157,000 to
$487,500.2 Unfortunately, Illinois has not been spared from this
increasing malpractice liability problem. 3 Moreover, this is not a recent
phenomenon.' Over the last forty years, medical malpractice liability
costs and insurance premiums have increased significantly. As the
result of growing potential jury awards, there is even greater incentive
for frivolous lawsuits, and many claims are filed without merit.6
Because of the increasing costs that medical malpractice lawsuits are
imposing on the health care system, Illinois needs liability reform to
stop this trend.
Opponents of limiting malpractice liability argue that there is no
proven correlation between limiting such liability and overall health

2. NAT'L Assoc. OF SPINE SPECIALISTS, POSITION STATEMENT ON MEDICAL LIABILITY

REFORM 2 (2010), available at http://www.spine.org/Documents/PositionStatementLiablity
Reform.pdf.
3.

See Carolyn Victoria J. Lees, The Inevitable Reevaluation of Best v. Taylor in Light of

Illinois' Health Care Crisis, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 217, 218 (2005) ("While the average jury
verdict award in Cook County in 1998 was $1.07 million, the average verdict jumped to $4.45
million in 2003. Even more astounding is the fact that the average pain and suffering award in
Cook County was $3.12 million in 2003."). From 1998 to 2003, there was a 415% increase in
noneconomic damages in Cook County. Robert M. Ackerman, Medical Malpractice:A Timefor
More Talk and Less Rhetoric, 37 MERCER L. REv. 725, 746 (1986).
4. REFORM NOW, supranote 1, at 4; Jane C. Arancibia, Statutory Caps on Damage Awards in

Medical MalpracticeCases, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 135, 136 (1988). In the 1970s, the health
care system faced challenges both in availability and affordability, and the 1980s brought
instability and uncertainty as premiums drastically increased for liability insurance, making health
care less affordable and causing specialists to cut back on many risky procedures. REFORM Now,
supra note 1, at 9; see also Arancibia,supra, at 139 (arguing that it is inaccurate to characterize
the 1980s as a crisis of affordability when the prohibitive cost of insurance made it practically
unavailable).
5. Arancibia, supra note 4, at 137 (citing Patricia M. Danzon et al., The Frequency and
Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 60

(1986)). The frequency and number of medical malpractice claims increased drastically from
1978 to 1984. Id. at 138. The leading medical malpractice insurance company reported a fiftyfive percent increase in total number of claims from 1980 to 1984. Id. Additionally, the St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Company reported that from 1969 to 1974 it saw the number of claims
increase from one claim for every twenty-three physicians to one claim for every ten physicians.
Danzon, supra, at 57. The average amount of claims went from $6,075 in 1969 to $12,534 in
1975. Id.
6. REFORM Now, supra note 1, at 6 (citing David M. Studdert, et. al., Claims, Error,and
Compensation Payments in Medical MalpracticeLitigation, 354 N. ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2024-33

(2006)). Research has shown that forty percent of closed claims are without merit (thirty-seven
percent did not involve medical error and three percent did not even involve injury). Id.
7. See Dennis Byrne, Supreme Court Sets Bad Public Policy, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 2010, at 15

(stating that the sky is the limit on damages in medical malpractice cases and that exorbitantly
high awards are problematic in Illinois); see also infra note 18 (describing how malpractice
liability caps have helped the health care system).
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care costs or quality.8 Although there is no consensus, there is research
suggesting that such a correlation exists.9 Moreover, whether or not
there is a statistically significant relationship, the increasing severity
and frequency of medical malpractice suits have unquestionably caused
liability insurance rates to rise and forced physicians to practice
"defensive medicine." 10 Some physicians refuse to perform risky
surgeries in order to avoid these costs; others simply close their
practices or choose to see more patients each day to ensure they can
afford rising malpractice insurance premiums.' 1 Although there are
other factors contributing to the health care crisis, 12 reducing
malpractice liability would cut out some costs that are driving it. 13
Fortunately, many states have acted to ameliorate this growing crisis
by instituting caps on certain damages.14 Over half of the fifty states
have enacted caps on jury awards of damages in medical malpractice
cases,15. and since the damages crisis began, forty-nine states have
8. See, e.g., Emily Chow, Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical Malpractice With
Potentially Fatal Complications, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 387, 417 (2007)

(arguing that reducing malpractice premiums does not seem to have a significant effect on the
affordability of health care); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD.

L. REv. 1093, 1143 (1996) (arguing that malpractice liability is not likely a significant contributor
to rising health care costs because it accounts for less than one percent of total national spending
on health care); Collin Sult, Questionable Medicine-Why FederalMedical MalpracticeReform

May Be Unconstitutional,47 ARIZ. L. REv. 195, 202 n.58 (2005) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 108-32,
pt. 1, at 237-66 (2003), which discussed numerous studies that show there is no correlation
between limits on liability and health care costs).
9. Thomas P. Hagen, "This May Sting a Little "-A Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis
Requires Insurers, Doctors, Patients, and Lawyers to Take Their Medicine, 26 SUFFOLK U. L.

REV. 147, 147-48 nn.1-7 (1992) (citing numerous studies that argue both in favor of and against
tort reform).
10. Id. at 147; Alec Shelby Bayer, Comment, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving Into
the Roots of the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 111, 114

(2005).
11. REFORM Now, supra note 1, at 10; Bayer, supra note 10, at 114.
12. See Bayer, supra note 10, at 121 (arguing that the government has oversimplified the
health care crisis, blaming it all on exorbitant jury awards and narrowly arguing for damage caps).
13. Act of Aug. 25, 2005, Pub. Act 94-677, § 101, 2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4964, invalidatedby
Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (lll. 2010); see also supra notes 1-5 and
accompanying text (discussing the problem with growing jury awards and the benefits
experienced by states who have instituted caps on damages).
14. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2011) (limiting total damages for a single
course of medical care against a health care professional to $1,000,000.00 and limiting
noneconomic damages in such cases to $250,000.00); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2011)
(limiting total damages in any medical malpractice verdict to $1,500,000.00 with a $50,000.00
increase in the cap each year starting July 1, 2000).
15.

David A. Hyman and Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform:

It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1085, 1091 (2006). Almost thirty states have some
kind of cap on damages in medical liability actions. AM. MED. ASSOC., CAPS ON DAMAGES
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enacted laws that are intended to reduce costs related to medical
malpractice liability.16 Opponents of caps argue that they are
insufficient to control the cost of liability insurance and ensure adequate
health care. 17 , However, states that limit damages have experienced
lower costs of malpractice liability insurance, lower medical
expenditures, and increased availability of health care services.1 8 It
seems likely, then, that limiting medical malpractice jury awards in
Illinois would effectively improve the availability and quality of health
care.
Recognizing the damages crisis facing Illinois and the efficacy of
limiting medical malpractice jury awards, the Illinois General Assembly
has enacted damage caps three times, but in each case the Illinois
Supreme Court found the caps unconstitutional.1 9 This Note examines
(2011), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/capsdamages.pdf [hereinafter
CAPS ON DAMAGES].
16. Carrie Lynn Vine, Addressing the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: Alternatives to
Damage Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413,420,436 (2006).
17. Melissa C. Gregory, Note, Capping Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Suits is
Not the Panaceaof the "MedicalLiability Crisis," 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1031, 1044-45
(2005); Michael S. Kenitz, Wisconsin's Caps on Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice
Cases: Where Wisconsin Stands (And Should Stand) on "Tort Reform," 89 MARQ. L. REV. 601,

622 (2006).
18. REFORM NOW, supra note 1, at 9 (citing Office of the Assistant Sec'y for Planning and
Evaluation, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Special Update on Med. Liability Crisis
(2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mlupdl.htm). The Department of Health
and Human Services found that states without limits on noneconomic damages experienced
significantly larger increases in liability insurance rates. Id. at 5. A study by Stanford University
found malpractice liability reforms such as caps on noneconomic damages reduced the
probability of a doctor being sued by 2.1 percent. REFORM Now, supra note 1, at 12. (citing
Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, The Effects of Malpractice Pressure and Liability
Reforms on Physicians'Perceptionsof Medical Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 81-106 (1997)).

Further, the same research shows that states that enacted these reforms saw an 8.4 percent
decrease in liability insurance premiums within three years of enacting them. Id. Even the
Congressional Budget Office found that caps on noneconomic damages are extremely effective in
reducing both the amount of claims paid and medical liability insurance premiums. REFORM
Now, supra note 1, at 14 (citing Cong. Budget Office, Preliminary Cost Estimate, H.R. 4250,
Patient Protection Act of 1998 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/7xx/doc701/
hr4250.pdf ). Similarly, reforms have been shown to significantly reduce medical expenditures.
REFORM NOW, supra note 1, at 14 (citing Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Do Doctors
Practice Defensive Medicine?, 445

Q.

J. OF ECON. 353, 353-390 (1996),

available at

http://www.nber.org/papers/w5466.pdf). Finally, states that have enacted malpractice liability
reforms show an increased availability of health care. Id (citing William E. Encinosa & Fred
Hellinger, Have State Caps on Malpractice Awards Increased The Supply of Physicians?,

HEALTH AFFAIRS, May 31, 2005, at W5-250-W5-W258, available at http://content.healthaffairs
.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.250v1). On average, states with caps on noneconomic damages have
2.2 percent more physicians per capita than states without these caps. Id.
19. See generally Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976)
(invalidating a $500,000.00 cap on total damages in medical malpractice suits); Best v. Taylor
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the most recent Illinois Supreme Court decision to do so, Lebron v.
Gottlieb Memorial Hospital. The Lebron court held that a cap on jury
awards for noneconomic damages 2 0 violated the separation of powers
doctrine because it functioned as a remittitur-the decision of a court to
order a new trial or lower the damages awarded at trial 2 1-which the
court found was an inherent power of the judiciary that cannot be
limited by the General Assembly. 2 2
Part II of this Note summarizes the previous Illinois court rulings on
the constitutionality of damage caps and discusses the history of the
separation of powers and remittitur doctrines in Illinois. 23 Part III then
discusses the facts of Lebron and the court's majority and dissenting
opinions in the case. 24 Next, Part IV analyzes each party's arguments
and concludes, contrary to the holding in Lebron, that statutory damage
caps do not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 25 Finally, Part V
suggests that Lebron's holding will have an impermissibly detrimental
effect on the Illinois health care system. 2 6 It also advocates both a
constitutional amendment and statutory language that would survive the
relevant constitutional considerations to enable future legislative
damage caps in Illinois. 27
II. BACKGROUND

The Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois General Assembly have
clashed for more than thirty years over the power to limit the amounts
of jury awards. This Part describes the background of previous Illinois
Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (invalidating 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1

(West 1996), which limited damages for noneconomic injuries in all common law tort claims to
$500,000.00); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (invalidating 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1706.5 (West 2008), which limited damages for noneconomic injuries in
medical malpractice suits to $500,000.00).
20. Noneconomic damages include any damages that are not awarded for out of pocket costs
paid by the plaintiff. 22 ILL. PRACTICE SERIES, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN ILLINOIS

§ 23.24, at 243 (3d ed. 2007).
21.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (9th ed. 2009).

The definition of remittitur in its

entirety is: "1. An order awarding a new trial, or a damages amount lower than that awarded by
the jury, and requiring the plaintiff to choose between those alternatives . ... 2. The process by
which a court requires either that the case be retried, or that the damages awarded by the jury be
reduced." Id.
22. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 905.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra PartV.
27. See infra Part V.
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statutes that attempted to cap damages and the conclusions of Illinois
Supreme Court cases that invalidated them. 2 8 Further, this Part
discusses the important case law developing the separation of powers
doctrine in Illinois-the same doctrine that the Lebron court relied on
when it invalidated the damage cap at issue. 29 Next, this Part explains
the incorporation of the remittitur doctrine from the English common
law into American law, and it evaluates how the doctrine subsequently
developed, both in Illinois and the rest of the country. 30 Finally, this
Part highlights Unzicker v. Kraft Foods Ingredients Corporation,3 1 a
2002 Illinois Supreme Court case that upheld a statutory limitation on
joint and several liability. 32 This case is crucial to understanding the
constitutional implications of damage caps because the court affirmed
the right of the General Assembly to alter the judiciary's finding of
liability.
A. Previous Illinois Caps on Damages and the Court'sInvalidation of
Those Caps

The Illinois General Assembly first attempted to limit a plaintiffs
The General
recovery in medical malpractice cases in 1975.33
Assembly limited total damages-including economic damages-to
$500,000, but the cap applied only in medical malpractice cases. 34 The
Illinois Supreme Court held this legislation unconstitutional in Wright v.
Central DuPage Hospital Association3 5 because it was "special

legislation" 36 prohibited by article IV, section 13 of the Illinois
Constitution. 37 Article IV, section 13 prohibits making or passing a
''special or local law when a general law is or can be made
applicable." 38 Accordingly, the Wright court held that limiting the cap
28.
29.
30.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.

31.

783 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2002).

32. See infra Part II.D.
33. ILL. REV. STAT. 1975, ch. 70, par. 101, invalidated by Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp.
Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).

34. Id.
35. 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).
36. "Legislation that affects only a specific geographic area or a particular class of persons.
Such legislation is unconstitutional if it arbitrarily or capriciously distinguishes between members
of the same class." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 982 (9th ed. 2009).
37. Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 743 (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. IV, § 13). The court found the
damage cap to be special legislation because it applied only to medical malpractice cases. Id.
38. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. IV, § 13. Article IV, section 13 further states:
Either of the following kinds of legislative actions may be held to violate the restriction
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solely to medical malpractice cases created an arbitrary special privilege
for those types of cases. 39 Notably, the court never argued or implied
that the cap itself was arbitrary; rather, it determined that applying the
cap solely to medical malpractice actions constituted a special law in
violation of the Illinois Constitution.4 0 Under this rationale, then, a cap
that applied to all civil actions would have been valid. 41
Years later, in response to the continued damages crisis and in light
of Wright's "special privileges" restriction, the General Assembly
passed section 2-1115.1 of Public Act 89-7 ("1996 cap"), which capped
compensatory damages 42 for noneconomic injuries 43 in all common law
tort claims at $500,000."
Although this legislation applied to all
on local or special laws:
Making a law apply to one or more particular persons or things named in the law.
Making a law apply to a described class of person or things that is illogical and unfair.
The latter violation overlaps with the prohibition on denying equal protection of the
laws in Article 1, section 2, and is determined under the same standards.
Id. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable is for the court to determine. Id.
39. Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 743 (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. IV, § 13).
40. See Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 743. The court distinguished the limit on recovery at issue in
Wright from other limits on recovery cited by the defendants, such as the Dram Shop Act and the
Wrongful Death Statute. Lees, supra note 3, at 225 (citing Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 743).
According to the court, this statute required a different conclusion because it changed the
common law, whereas the other limits to recovery involved statutory claims. Id.
41. See Lees, supra note 3, at 494-95 (arguing that the court in Best, which considered a
statute similar to the one in Wright except that it applied generally to all tortfeasors, could have
distinguished the cap from the one in Wright on the basis that it did not apply only to health care
professionals and hospitals but applied generally to all tortfeasors).
42. Compensatory damages are those that "indemnify the injured party for the loss suffered."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (9th ed. 2009).

43. Noneconomic damages, although difficult to assess, compensate injuries that do not
compel the injured party to pay out of pocket expenses, such as pain, suffering, and loss of
society. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 905 (Ill. 2010); Drews v. Gobel
Freight Lines, Inc., 557 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
44. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1(a) (2010), invalidatedby Best v. Taylor Mach. Works,
689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). This statute stated in relevant part:
In all common law, statutory or other actions that seek damages on account of death,
bodily injury, or physical damages to property based on negligence, or product liability
based on any theory or doctrine, recovery of non-economic damages shall be limited to
$500,000 per plaintiff. There shall be no recovery for hedonic damages.
Id. Unlike the statute at issue in Wright, the preamble of the statute in Best stated the policy
justifications for enacting the cap. CompareAct of Mar. 9, 1995, 2005 Ill. Laws 284 (stating the
General Assembly's finding that states limiting noneconomic damages had experienced a
decrease in health care costs), with Act of Sept. 12, 1975, 1975 Ill. Laws 2888 (capping
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to $500,000.00 without discussing policy
justifications). Similar policy discussions are common to statutory limits on damages which have
been upheld in other states. See, e.g., Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. 2002)
(stating that the legislation at issue was prompted by the legislature's concern over the availability
and affordability of health care in light of medical liability costs); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson,
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common law claims, unlike the cap at issue in Wright, the court found
in Best v. Taylor Machine Works that it also was special legislation

because the amount of $500,000 was inherently arbitrary. 4 5 The court
in Best then bolstered the case against damage caps with its separation
of powers discussion. 4 6 It reasoned that a statutory limit on damages
functioned as a type of remittitur instituted by the General Assembly
and that remittitur was an inherent function of the judiciary. 47 As a
result, the court argued that the General Assembly would violate the
separation of powers doctrine by enacting any cap on damages in
common law tort claims. 4 8
The separation of powers analysis in Best was a significant leap from
the court's holding in Wright, which did not phrase the issue in terms of
separation of powers despite a nearly identical set of facts. 49 The
finding was also unexpected because it came as unnecessary judicial
dicta; the court had already resolved the case based on its finding of
special legislation and went into a discussion of remittitur only to
provide an additional reason for finding the statute unconstitutional. 50
Nonetheless, Best strengthened the case law against statutory caps on
damages in Illinois by affirming a new constitutional argument against
880 N.E.2d 420, 430 (Ohio 2007) (stating that the General Assembly of Ohio reviewed evidence
and found that tort reform was likely to improve the economy by reducing rising costs of the tort
system).
45. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1072-78. The court held that the cap would arbitrarily hurt
individuals with significant noneconomic damages. Id. Plaintiffs with nominal damages would
be unfairly advantaged because in some cases the cap would not even apply to reduce their award.
Id. This finding was unprecedented; the court in Wright did not find that the cap was inherently
arbitrary even though it had the opportunity to make the same finding. See generally Wright, 347
N.E.2d 736 (finding that the cap was arbitrary solely because it applied only to medical
malpractice cases). Instead, the court found that the General Assembly had authority to abolish
the common law. Id. at 743.
46. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1081.
47. Id at 1079.
48. Id,
49. See generally Wright, 347 N.E.2d 743 (holding that the damage cap at issue was special
legislation). The court in Best also evaluated Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 1972)
(finding a law which limited recovery for plaintiffs in automobile accidents to be unconstitutional
because it was special legislation that arbitrarily limited recovery based on whether the defendant
was using the vehicle for commercial or personal purposes) and Grasse v. Dealer's Transport
Co., 106 N.E.2d 124 (111. 1952) (finding that a law which limited recovery based on whether or
not the tortfeasor was an employee under the Worker's Compensation Act was arbitrary special
legislation). However, none of these cases held that damage caps are inherently special
legislation because they have an arbitrary cut off.
50. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 906-07 (Ill. 2010); Best, 689 N.E.2d at
1078-80. Even the majority opinion in Lebron acknowledged that this discussion regarding
separation of powers was judicial dictum. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 906-07.
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these caps: that they function as a form of legislative remittitur and
unduly infringe on the inherent power of the judiciary to remit jury
awards.5 '
However, the Best holding did not deter the General Assembly,
which enacted another cap on damages in 2005, section 2-1706.5 of
Public Act 94-677 ("2005 cap"). The 2005 cap provided:
(1) In a case of an award against a hospital and its personnel or
hospital affiliates, as defined in Section 10.8 of the Hospital Licensing
Act, the total amount of noneconomic damages shall not exceed
$1,000,000 awarded to all plaintiffs in any civil action arising out of
the care.
(2) In a case of an award against a physician and the physician's
business or corporate entity and personnel or health care professional,
the total amount of non-economic damages shall not exceed $500,000
awarded to all plaintiffs in any civil action arising out of the care. 52
Given the General Assembly's struggle with the court on this issue, it is
no surprise that the constitutionality of the 2005 cap would eventually
be called into question by Lebron.
B. Description of the SeparationofPowers Doctrine in Illinois
The separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution states that
"[t]he legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No
branch shall exercise power properly belonging to another." 53
However, as with the U.S. Constitution and other state constitutions, 54
51. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078-80; see also Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 899 (discussing how the
circuit court of Cook County relied on Best in finding that caps on noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases were unconstitutional because of the separation of powers doctrine).
52. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1706.5 (2010), invalidated by Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp.,
930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010).
53. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. II, § 1.
54. E.g., Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 527 (Colo. 1985); Norwood v.
Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1148 (Ohio 2006); Hale v. Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No. 49, 198 P.3d 1021,
1026 (Wash. 2009). Justice Robert H. Jackson also affirmed this principle in his concurring
opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring). Justice Jackson argued that the Constitution requires not just separation and
autonomy but interdependence and reciprocity. Id The interpretations of the separation of
powers doctrine by other states are relevant because they have applied the same basic separation
of powers framework. See John Devlin, Toward a State ConstitutionalAnalysis of Allocation of
Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees PerformingAdministrative Functions, 66 TEMP.

L. REv. 1205, 1264-65 (1993) (discussing the similarities and difference between the separation
of powers doctrine in different states and arguing that the similarities overwhelm the differences).
Further, the U.S. Constitution and federal interpretations thereof carry value that should be
considered when state courts interpret their own constitutions. Lawrence Friedman, The
Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New JudicialFederalism, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93,

106 (2000).
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the separation of powers doctrine does not require complete and
absolute division of authority.55 Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Illinois system of government inherently
entails some powers that are shared between the three branches.56
Notably, the court has held that the General Assembly has the power to
legislate matters that relate to judicial authority so long as such laws do
not "unduly infringe upon the inherent power of the judiciary."57
Further, the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently upheld the General
Assembly's right to repeal, change, or eliminate all or part of the
judicially created common law. 58 Although the General Assembly is
required to act within the Illinois Constitution and is bound to follow
the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of what laws are
constitutional, 59 its power to alter or abate the common law is superior
to that of the court. 60 Moreover, there is a strong presumption of
constitutionality that comes with all legislative actions. 61 Therefore, the
burden of proving the invalidity of the statute lies with the party

55. Strukoff v. Strukoff, 389 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (1ll. 1979) (stating that separation of powers
does not require a "complete divorce" of the three branches of our system of government); see
also In re Barker's Estate, 345 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ill. 1976) (explaining that the separation of
powers doctrine does not require the powers of government to be "rigidly separated" into
different compartments). The real purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is to prevent all
power from being held in the hands of one branch of government. Id.
56. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Barrett, 15 N.E.2d 513, 514 (Ill. 1938) (stating that applicable
provisions of the Illinois Constitution "d[o] not mean that the legislative, executive and judicial
power should be kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no connection or dependence
. . . ."); People ex rel. Witte v. Franklin, 186 N.E. 137, 139 (Ill. 1933) (holding that with
separation of power clauses "there is a theoretical or practical recognition of this maxim and at
the same time a blending and admixture of different powers. . . .").
57. People v. Taylor, 464 N.E.2d 1059, 1062-63 (111.1984). Notably, the Taylor court took
notice of the actions of other states in reaching its conclusion. Id. (citing State v. Higgins, 592
S.W.2d 151, 155 (Mo. 1979), overruled by Kuyper v. Stone Cnty. Comm'n, 838 S.W.2d 436
(Mo. 1992) (on separate grounds)).
58. People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 286 (111. 1990) (citing People v. Davis, 116 N.E.2d
372, 374 (Ill. 1953)).
59. Henson v. City of Chicago, 114 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Ill. 1953) (stating that the power of the
court to determine that legislative actions are unconstitutional is limited to deciding whether the
law is within the legislature's constitutional power); Sutter v. People's Gaslight & Coke Co., 120
N.E.2d 562, 565 (111.1918) (stating that it is the plain duty of the court to find actions by the
General Assembly unconstitutional when they violate the Illinois Constitution); see also David
Fink, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, The Remittitur Doctrine, and The Implications for Tort

Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV 227, 261 (1999) (quoting Gersch, 553 N.E.2d at 287) (emphasizing
that the Gersch holding affirms that "the judiciary 'is duty bound to strike down unconstitutional
acts of the legislature"').
60. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (2010); Gersch, 553 N.E.2d at 286.
61. Chi. Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1250 (Ill. 1985); Sanelli
v. Glenview State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226, 234 (Ill. 1985).
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challenging it. 62 This presumption attaches to any legislative cap on
damages, and the party challenging the cap bears the burden of proving
that it is unconstitutional.63
C. Development of the Remittitur Doctrine
The Illinois Supreme Court in Best found that caps on damages
violated the separation of powers doctrine because they functioned as a
form of legislative remittitur. 64 As explained above, remittitur is the
exercise of reducing a jury award when the court finds that it is
excessive. 65 An award is not subject to remittitur if the court finds that
it is reasonable and supported by the facts of the case. 66 Further, the
plaintiff must agree to the remittitur in order for it to be upheld,67 and if
the plaintiff is unwilling to do so, the judge must order a new trial.
In Best, the court reasoned that remittitur is an inherently judicial
function because of tradition, 69 and it primarily cited U.S. Supreme
Court precedent to support this proposition. 70 Indeed, the judiciary has
had the power to correct excessive jury verdicts in limited situations for
over a century, 71 and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this power in
62. Chi, Nat'l League, 483 N.E.2d at 1250; Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 234.
63. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 902 (Ill. 2010). For a more detailed
analysis of this presumption, see infra Part IV.D.
64. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1081 (Ill. 1997).
65. Id at 1079. An award is "excessive if it falls outside the range of fair and reasonable
compensation or results from passion or prejudice . . . ." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Chapman,
676 N.E.2d 621, 628 (Ill. 1997) (internal quotations omitted)). In Richardson, the court also held
that an award is excessive when "it is so large that it shocks the judicial conscience." Richardson,
676 N.E.2d at 628.
66. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1079 (citing Lee v. Chi. Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 509-10 (Ill.
1992)). The Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed this principle in Richardson v. Chapman, in
which it held that a determination of what is excessive involves evaluating whether the damages
are supported by the record. Richardson, 676 N.E.2d at 628. This evaluation requires thorough
scrutiny of the facts of the case. Sandy v. Lake St. Elevated R.R. Co., 85 N.E. 300, 302 (Ill.
1908).
67. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1079-80 (citing Haid v. Tingle, 579 N.E.2d 913, 916 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991)).
68. Haid,579 N.E.2d at 917. Plaintiffs commonly agree to remit the jury award to avoid the
costs and risks associated with a new trial.
69. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1079 ("For over a century it has been a traditional and inherent
power of the judicial branch of government to apply the doctrine of remittitur, in appropriate and
limited circumstances, to correct excessive jury verdicts.").
70. See id. (citing Lee, 605 N.E.2d at 480; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1935);
Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397,410 (1896)).
71. The practice was first adopted by Justice Story in 1822. See infra notes 73-74 and
accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of the incorporation of remittitur into
American law.
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1827.72 However, the authority behind judicial remittitur was often
questioned,73 and its constitutionality was even challenged in some
jurisdictions. 74 These questions arose because judicial remittitur was
first utilized at the trial level before its legitimacy was ever established
by English common law, reviewing courts, or statute. 75 Nevertheless,
the U.S. Supreme Court eventually accepted the legitimacy of remittitur
in Dimick v. Schiedt because it was regularly applied by the lower
courts for more than a hundred years. 76 However, the Dimick Court did
point out that it would have found remittitur unconstitutional if it had
been addressing the issue for the first time.77
The Illinois Supreme Court provided more nuanced analysis of this
issue when it distinguished between damages in civil actions created by
statute from those based on common law.7 In In re Estate ofJolliff, the
court determined that a legislative floor on recovery for statutory claims
was not a legislative remittitur and did not violate the separation of
powers doctrine. 79 The court found that because the General Assembly
72. See generally Jones v. Lloyd, 1 111. 225, 226 (1827) (holding that courts have the power to
fix excessive jury verdicts). Interestingly, the court acknowledged the practice of remittitur based
on a discussion of its application in New York courts. Id. at 226. However, the Illinois Supreme
Court did not remit the jury award at issue in Jones because it found that the trial court was
responsible for doing so. See id ("The plaintiff should, at the trial, have required a correction of
the verdict .... ).
73. See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 483 (discussing Justice Story's incorporation of remittitur into
U.S. doctrine in Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (D. Mass. 1822)). The Dimick Court found it
remarkable that no cases following Justice Story's conclusion challenged the constitutionality of
judicial remittitur. Id. The Court pointed out that Justice Story only cited as authority for
remittitur the ability of the court to grant a new trial when there are excessive damages. Blunt, 3
F. Cas. at 761-62. Upon this basis, Justice Story created the court's authority to remit the jury's
award. Id. In Blunt, even Justice Story stated that he hesitated to interfere with the verdict and
believed he was even going "to the very limits of the law." Id. at 762. However, he held that so
long as the plaintiff was willing to remit $500 of his damages, the court would not interfere any
further. Id.
74. Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court in Dimick only questioned the constitutionality of
judicial remittitur, the Missouri Supreme Court banned remittitur in an en banc decision in 1985.
Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
Although the Missouri legislature subsequently reestablished judicial remittitur, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.068 (2011), the court in Firestone found that the application of judicial remittitur was
inconsistent and confused. Firestone,693 S.W.2d at 110.
75. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 483.
76. Id. at 484-85. The Court held that "the doctrine would not be reconsidered or disturbed at
this late day." Id. at 485.
77. Id. at 484.
78. See generally In re Estate of Jolliff, 771 N.E.2d 346, 356-57 (111.2002) (finding that the
legislature had power to determine a floor on damages because it had established the cause of
action by statute).
79. Id.
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created the claim, it also had the power to control the minimum amount
of that claim. 80 Thus, the court's holding in Jollhff gave the General
Assembly the power to force the judiciary to award a specified amount
of damages to a plaintiff, even if the common law did not enable any
recovery at all. 8 1
D. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corporation: Holding that the
Illinois GeneralAssembly Has Power to Limit a Defendant'sLiability
in Common Law Claims
Five years after the Illinois Supreme Court determined in Best that
caps on damages for noneconomic injuries were unconstitutional, it
considered the constitutionality of section 2-1117, a statute that limited
joint liability in cases where one defendant was less than 25%
responsible for the injury. 82 In Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients
Corp., the plaintiff challenged the trial court's apportionment of liability
that resulted from the plaintiff sustaining injuries at a Kraft plant. 83
After being sued by the plaintiff, Kraft filed a third party claim against
the plaintiff's employer, which Kraft had contracted to install steel
piping in its plant. 84 The trial court found that Kraft was only 1%liable
and that the employer was 99% liable.85 Although the common law rule
of joint and several liability would have allowed the plaintiff to recover
the entire amount of damages from either defendant, Kraft and the
employer were only severally liable for the damages under section 21117.86 Thus, the plaintiff could only recover 1%of the damages from
Kraft. 87
80. Id. at 357. Jolhff evaluated a statute that enabled relatives who had provided care for a
disabled person to bring a claim against that person's estate upon their death. Id.; see also 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-1.1 (2010) (addressing statutory custodial claims).
81. See Jolhff 771 N.E.2d at 358 (holding that the General Assembly had power to establish
statutory floors on damages in statutory causes of action). The Illinois Appellate Court made a
similar finding in Knauerhaze v. Nelson, 836 N.E.2d 640, 665-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). In
Knauerhaze, the court held that the General Assembly had power to cap damages under a
statutory claim to the defendant's maximum insurance coverage. Id. at 665-66. Like the court in
Jollyj the court found that this did not violate the separation of powers because the legislature
had created the claim in the first place and therefore had authority over that claim. Id.
82. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1034-35 (Ill. 2002) (citing
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117 (West 1994)) (evaluating the impact of § 2-1117 on a
plaintiff's right to recovery).
83. Id. at 1028-29.
84. Id.
85. Id.

86. See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 199-200 (Ill. 1983) (discussing the
traditional approach taken in negligence actions).
87. Id at 1029. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 abrogates the common law approach,
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Relying on Best, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of this
statute by arguing that it was an arbitrary legislative remittitur in
violation of the separation of powers clause.8 8 However, the Unzicker
court rejected this analysis and upheld the General Assembly's ability to
determine "when a defendant can be held liable for the full amount of a
jury's verdict." 89 Moreover, the court determined that lowering a
defendant's liability was not a legislative remittitur.90 Therefore, under
Unzicker, the separation of powers clause in the Illinois Constitution
does not limit the General Assembly's ability to abrogate the common
law approach in order to limit a defendant's liability for damages. 9 1
Prior to Lebron, the doctrine of remittitur was an established function
of the judiciary, but its inherency was questionable. 92 Although there
was some evidence that caps on damages would be held
unconstitutional as a form of legislative remittitur in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine, this was not yet clear because the
reasoning in Best was dicta and the Unzicker holding supported the
power of the legislature to reduce a defendant's total liability. 93

dictating that "[a]ny defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of
the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party
defendant except the plaintiffs employer, shall be severally liable for all other damages." 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2010).
88. Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1042.

89. Id,; Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants Gottlieb Memorial Hospital and Florence
Martinoz, R.N. at 9, Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (Nos. 105741,
105745), 2008 WL 7890623 (quoting Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1042) [hereinafter Reply Brief].
90. Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1042. The Unzicker court distinguished the statute it was
addressing from the 1996 cap by stating that it did not reduce the amount of the jury's verdict. Id.
The court did not, however, affirm the analysis from Best that caps on damages functioned as
judicial remittitur in violation of the separation of powers. See id. (distinguishing the statute at
issue in Unzicker from the 1996 cap without addressing the merits of the separation of powers
analysis from Best). Thus, the separation of powers analysis from Best remained judicial dicta.
See Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 926 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the Best separation of powers analysis was judicial dicta and therefore not binding on the
court).
91. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 910 (stating that the Unzicker court held that the General Assembly
could determine when a defendant would be liable for all the damages the jury awarded to the
plaintiff); see also Reply Brief, supra note 89, at 24-25 (arguing that Unzicker upheld the right of
the General Assembly to limit a defendant's liability in common law claims and that this
extended to caps on damages).
92. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of remittitur and
whether it is an inherent function of the judiciary).
93. See supra Part II.A-D (discussing the separation of powers clause and the analyses from
Best and Unzicker).
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III. DiscussioN

In the controversial case of Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital,
the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a cap on damages for
noneconomic injuries in medical malpractice cases on the grounds that
it violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.94
While the court agreed that the separation of powers analysis from Best
was judicial dicta, it applied the court's analysis from Best on the basis
that judicial dictum is to be followed unless it is clearly erroneous. 95
This Part presents the facts of Lebron and the findings of the trial
court. 96 It then discusses the Illinois Supreme Court's majority and
dissenting opinions. 97
A. The Facts of Lebron
Frances Lebron was under the care of Dr. Levi-D'Ancona during her
pregnancy and was admitted to Gottlieb Memorial Hospital on October
31, 2005 to deliver her baby.98 Dr. Levi-D'Ancona delivered Abigaile
Lebron by Caesarean section, and Florence Martinoz assisted in the
delivery and provided nursing care throughout the duration of Lebron's
admission. 99 As a result of the delivery, Abigaile sustained numerous
permanent injuries, including "severe brain injury, cerebral palsy,
cognitive mental impairment, inability to be fed normally, and abnormal
neurological function."' 00 The plaintiffs alleged that all injuries and
resulting impairments resulted from the acts and omissions of the
defendants, Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, Dr. Levi-D'Ancona, and nurse
Martinoz. 10 1
Lebron and her daughter filed a medical malpractice and declaratory
94. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 914. The statute limited damage awards against hospitals and its
personnel or hospital affiliates for noneconomic injuries to $1,000,000. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-1706.5 (2010), invalidatedby Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010). It
also limited damage awards against a physician and his business or corporate entity to $500,000.
Id. The Lebron holding was a controversial decision that incited further debate on whether
damage caps should be part of reforming the health care system and whether they are
constitutional. David M. Goldhaber & David J. Grycz, Illinois Adds Fuel to the Fiery National
Healthcare Deabte, 22 HEALTH LAW. 19, 19 (2010); see also Bruce Japsen & Ameet Sachdev,
Medical MalpracticeLaw Ruled Unconstitutional,CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 2010, at 23 (describing
physicians who were upset with the result of Lebron).
95. See infra Part III.B.
96. See infra Part Ul.A.
97. See infra Part III.B-C.
98. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 899-900.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 900.
101. Id.
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judgment action in Cook County Circuit Court against the defendants in
November 2006.102 According to the complaint, Abigaile sustained
numerous injuries during the Caesarean section that Dr. Levi-D'Ancona
performed on Lebron. 103 Of Lebron's claims, the most relevant for the
purposes of this Note was the claim that sought declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of the statutory damage cap that limited recovery
against healthcare workers and hospitals in malpractice actions. 104
Specifically, Lebron sought a judicial determination that the 2005 cap
was unconstitutional and did not apply to their cause of action on the
basis that it violated the separation of powers clause. 105 Lebron
contended that Abigaile sustained injuries, endured pain, and suffered
damages that would exceed the 2005 cap, and thus, that the cap would
displace the judiciary's power to determine damages. 106 Lebron also
alleged that the cap violated the prohibition of improper special
legislation, the right to a trial by jury, the due process clause, the equal
protection clause, and the right to a certain and complete remedy-all
provisions of the Illinois Constitution.10 7
The 2005 cap challenged by Lebron was part of Public Act 94-677, a
focused effort by the Illinois General Assembly to remedy the health
care crisis. 108 The General Assembly found that health care costs were
increasing at unsustainable rates and that the availability of such care
was simultaneously declining, thereby threatening the health and safety
of Illinois citizens. 109 To combat this trend, the General Assembly
made changes to the Illinois Insurance Code, the Medical Practice Act
of 1987, and the Good Samaritan Act. 110 It also initiated the "Sorry
Works! Pilot Program Act" to determine if health care professionals'
prompt apologies and settlement offers affected the costs of malpractice
102. Id. at 899.
103. Id. at 900.
104. Id. The constitutional challenge most relevant for this Note was the separation of powers
challenge. See id. (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. II, § 1) (discussing the constitutional challenge
in Lebron).
105. Id. (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. II, § 1).
106. Id.
107. See id.(discussing the plaintiffs complaint).
108. Act of Aug. 25, 2005, Pub. Act 94-677, 2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4964-65 (describing the
Act as a comprehensive reform package intended to address the health care crisis), invalidatedby
Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (111.2010).
109. Id. The General Assembly argued that increasing medical liability insurance costs in
Illinois reduces the availability of health care by discouraging health care professionals from
practicing medicine. Id.
110. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 903 (citing §§ 310, 315, 340, 2005 Ill. Laws at 4965-95, 5002-03,
invalidatedby Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010)).
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claims."ll Thus, the 2005 cap was just one of several reforms that the
General Assembly enacted to remedy the health care crisis. 112
The trial court, relying on the separation of powers analysis from
Best, held that the 2005 cap was unconstitutional based on the
separation of powers doctrine because it operated as a legislative
remittitur. 113 Pursuant to the inseverability provision of the Act,1 14 the
trial court declared the entire Act unconstitutional both on its face,
because it violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois
Constitution, and as applied to Lebron. 115 The defendants appealed
directly to the Illinois Supreme Court on the basis of Supreme Court
Rule 302(a)." 6
B. The Majority Opinion
The Illinois Supreme Court first reversed the circuit court's finding
that the 2005 cap was unconstitutional as applied because it was
unnecessary in light of the court's ruling that the statute was facially
invalid and because there were no evidentiary hearings or findings of
fact to determine how the cap applied to Lebron. 1 7 The court then
addressed the argument that the cap was facially invalid-that there
were no circumstances under which the statute could be upheld." 8 The
court primarily relied on its reasoning in Best to reach its conclusion. 11 9
However, before it addressed the substantive arguments regarding
separation of powers, the court disposed of the defendants' argument
that the separation of power analysis in Best was non-binding dicta that
should not be followed. 120 The Lebron court agreed that the separation
of powers analysis in Best was not necessary to the conclusion it

111. Id. at 906 (citing §§ 401-95, 2005 111.Laws at 5004-05).
112. See id (discussing other reforms that were included in the Act of Aug. 25, 2005).
113. Idat901.
114. The inseverability provision established that if any one provision in the Act is found
unconstitutional, the entire Act must also be found unconstitutional. § 995, 2005 Ill. Laws at
5005.
115. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 899, 902-03.
2d R. 302(a)).
116. Id. at 901-02 (citing 210 111.
117. Id at 902.
118. Id. (citing Napleton v. Vill. of Hinsdale, 891 N.E.2d 839, 846 (Ill. 2008)).
119. Id. at 900 (arguing that the court did not decide the case on a "blank slate" but had to
consider the analysis from Best to guide its findings); Jeffrey A. Parness, Judicial Versus
Legislative Authority after Lebron, 98 ILL. B.J. 324, 324-25 (2010); Bethany Krajelis, Court
Strikes Down Medical Malpractice Law, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 4, 2010, at 1. The Lebron

court provides a detailed discussion of its decision in Best. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 903-06.
120. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 906-08.
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reached in that case. 12 1 However, the mhajority distinguished between
obiter dictuml 22 and judicial dictum1 2 3 and concluded that the
separation of powers analysis in Best was the latter.124 According to the
court, judicial dictum was to be given much deference and applied
unless the analysis was erroneous. 125 The court also pointed out that
that the defendants only argued that the Best analysis was not
controlling and not that the analysis was erroneous. 126
The court continued by addressing the substantive constitutional
issues relating to the caps on damages.127 However, it did not find the
statute unconstitutional on the basis that it was unlawful special
legislation: in fact, the court opposed the defendants' attempts to
conflate the special legislation analysis with the separation of powers
analysis from Best.128 The court also rejected the defendants' argument
121. Id. at 906; see also Parness, supra note 119, at 324-35 (summarizing that the Lebron
court recognized that the separation of powers analysis in Best was merely judicial dicta). The
statute at issue in Best had been found unconstitutional on the basis that it was unlawful special
legislation before the court addressed the separation of powers challenge. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at
906.
122. Obiter dictum is a "judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one
that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be
considered persuasive)." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009).
123. Judicial dictum is "[a]n opinion by a court on a question that is directly involved, briefed,

and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that is not essential to the decision."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).

124. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 906-07. Obiter dictum is a "remark or opinion that a court uttered
as an aside, and is generally not binding authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule." Id.
at 907 (citing Exelon Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 917 N.E.2d 899, 907 (Ill. 2009)). According to
the Lebron court, obiter dictum, which is not given much weight, is treated differently than
judicial dictum. Id. Judicial dictum is a statement by the court that is not essential to the
outcome of the opinion. Id The Lebron court also states that judicial dictum arises only when
both parties argue the issue, but the court deliberately passes on the issue. Id. Further, the
Lebron court argued that these characteristics were present in Best because the parties briefed the
issue of separation of powers and the court deliberately passed upon it. Id. The court also holds
that the conclusion in Best was expressed like a holding, making it more persuasive. Id. (citing
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1081 (Ill. 1997); Unzicker v. Kraft Food
Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1029, 1042 (ll. 2002)). Finally, it concludes that the defendants
did not argue that the analysis from Best was erroneous. Id
125. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 907 (citing Exelon, 917 N.E.2d at 907). The court's judicial dicta
is erroneous if it is incorrect or inconsistent with the law or facts. Exelon, 917 N.E.2d at 907;
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 621 (9th ed. 2009).

126. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 907.
127. See id. at 908-12 (analyzing the substantive constitutional issues relating to the caps on
damages).
128. Id at 908. The court argued that the Attorney General conflated the analysis of these two
issues when it argued in the context of separation of powers that the statute at issue in Lebron was
rationally related to the government's purpose of addressing the growing health care crisis even
though the statute in Best was not. Id. According to the court, this discussion is not relevant to
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that the statute should be uphefd because it was part of a comprehensive
attempt by the General Assembly to ameliorate the damages crisis. 129
According to the court, there was one question left to be decided:
whether the General Assembly violated the separation of powers
doctrine by performing an inherent function of the judiciary.130
The court first distinguished Unzicker, the authority relied on by the
defendants to support their argument that the General Assembly could
limit a defendant's liability without violating the separation of powers
doctrine.131 The court stated that the issue in that case, unlike the issue
in Lebron, was whether the General Assembly could enact a statute that
determined when a defendant was liable for the full amount of damages
awarded. 132 The Lebron court emphasized that the Unzicker opinion
actually distinguished itself from Best and argued that the statute
changing joint and several liability was not the same as a legislative
remittitur. 133 The Lebron court also reasoned that the 2005 cap did
more than limit when a defendant could be held liable for noneconomic
the separation of powers issue and was not addressed in the separation of powers analysis from
Best. Id. In addition to the special legislation challenge, the Lebron court did not address in its
opinion due process and the right to a certain and complete remedy, other Illinois constitutional
protections that were raised by the plaintiffs. Id.; Parness,supra note 119, at 324-25.
129. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 909-10. The court stated that this does not affect whether or not a
statute is unconstitutional. Id.
130. Id. The court also uses this analysis to discard the defendants' argument that the statute
should not be held unconstitutional because it does not burden one class of plaintiffs as did the
statute at issue in Best. Id. at 909. The court did not evaluate whether the statute disadvantaged
any one group. Id.
131. Id at9lO.
132. Id (citing Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1029, 1042 (Ill. 2002));
Parness, supra note 119, at 324-25. Defendants argued that the separation of powers clause does
not prevent the General Assembly from limiting a defendant's liability even if the defendant
would be liable under common law. Brief and Appendix of Defendants-Appellants Gottlieb
Memorial Hospital and Florence Martinoz, R.N. at 26-27, Lebron, 930 N.E.2d 895 (Nos. 105741,
105745), 2008 WL 7890597 [hereinafter Defendants' Brief]. In their brief, the defendants relied
in part on the court's holding in Unzicker, where the court reasoned that altering common law
joint and several liability "is simply not a legislative remittitur." Id. at 27 (citing Unzicker, 783
N.E.2d at 1042). These defendants also cite Siegall v. Solomon, 166 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ill. 1960), in
which the Illinois Supreme Court held that the General Assembly did not violate the separation of
powers clause by limiting punitive damages. Defendants' Brief, supra, at 28. However, the
Lebron court distinguished compensatory damages from punitive damages. See infra notes 146148 and accompanying text (discussing how the Lebron court distinguished punitive damage caps
from damage caps for noneconomic injuries). The court reasoned that the statute in Unzicker was
not a cap on damages and it "did not require a trial judge to enter a judgment 'at variance with the
jury's determination and without regard to the court's duty to consider, on a case-by-case basis,
whether the jury's verdict is excessive."' Parness, supra note 119, at 324 (citing Lebron, 930
N.E.2d at 911).
133. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 910.
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damages.1 34 Instead, it altogether eliminated the ability of the court to
award noneconomic damages above a certain amount in any medical
malpractice case regardless of the apportionment of liability.' 35
Therefore, the court found that Unzicker did not apply.13 6
The majority opinion then distinguished the facts of Lebron from the
facts of Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, which was cited by

defendants to support their position.137 In Burger, the court addressed a
statute that mandated the maintenance of medical records and regulated
disclosure of those records. 138 Although the defendants argued that the
statute in Burger infringed upon the court's authority over its own
discovery procedures,1 39 the Lebron court simply asserted that the
statute did not impinge the court's power because the statute did not
regulate the conduct of discovery.14 0 Similarly, the court addressed
defendants'

use of Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v.

Thompson,141 which upheld the General Assembly's right to pass
134. See supra note 132 (discussing the Lebron court's finding that the cap at issue went
beyond just limiting liability and forced the court to enter judgment regardless of the jury's award
and findings of fact).
135. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 910-11.
136. Id.; see also Goldhaber & Grycz, supra note 94, at 20 (describing how the Lebron court
found that the cap at issue required trial courts to decrease jury awards and enter judgment in an
amount equal to the cap); Helen Gunnarsson, Illinois Supreme Court: Statutory Med-Mal Caps
are Unconstitutional,98 ILL. B.J. 122, 122 (2010) (emphasizing the Lebron court's finding that

the cap at issue would require the court to override a jury's award and reduce damages regardless
of the particular facts of the case).
137. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 911 (citing Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 759 N.E.2d 533 (Ill.
2001)).
138. Burger, 759 N.E.2d at 536-38. The statute at issue in Burger enabled hospital staff to
discuss the standard of treatment of a plaintiff with attorneys for the hospital. Id. at 537-38
(citing 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85/6.17 (West 2000)). The court held that the discussions
between hospitals and their staff or agents were "intracorporate conversations" regarding the
property and responsibility of the hospital. Id. at 548. Further, it held that this information was
not triggered by litigation but promoted the general health and welfare of the public by allowing
hospitals to investigate the treatment of patients. Id Thus, the court held that these provisions
did not regulate discovery and therefore did not impinge upon an inherent power of the judiciary.
Id.

139. Defendants relied on Burger to argue that the legislature can enact a statute affecting
litigation so long as the statute serves a legitimate legislative goal. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 911.
The Lebron defendants also argued that "the separation of powers allows the legislature to enact
statutes affecting the conduct of litigation if its purpose is to serve legitimate legislative goals.
Defendants' Brief, supranote 132, at 37-38.
140. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 911.
141. 483 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. 1985). In Chicago National League, the court held that the
legislature did not violate the separation of powers by enacting a statute that governed nuisance
even though a private nuisance claim would typically be brought by an aggrieved party before the
judiciary. Id. at 1248. The court held that the legislature clearly has broad discretion to enact
policies that protect the public health and welfare. Id.
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nuisance laws, and Strukoff v. Strukoff,14 2 which upheld its right to
regulate court proceedings that involved the Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act. 143 The court discarded the use of these cases by
simply stating that they were "inapposite."'"
The heart of the court's argument was that, although the General
Assembly is empowered to change the common law and available
remedies, it must do so within the purview of the Illinois
Constitution. 145 The court first emphasized that h6lding the statute in
question unconstitutional did not contradict prior case law in which the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the General Assembly's power to limit
punitive damages. 146 The court argued that punitive damages are
distinguishable from compensatory damages because they only uphold
the interest of society and do not function to repay an injured
plaintiff.14 7 Further, the court emphasized that a prior Illinois Supreme
142. 389 N.E.2d 1170 (111.1979). Strukoff addressed a provision of the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/403(e) (2010), which mandates the civil
procedure rules in divorce cases. Strukoff N.E.2d at 1171. The court recognized that the
judiciary has authority to make rules which regulate the trial of cases. Id. However, it
emphasized that the separation of powers does not prevent one branch of government from
exercising functions that are traditionally exercised by another. Id. at 1172. Further, the
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act was statutory in nature, giving the legislature authority
to modify the court's rulemaking process as to that Act. Id. at 1172-73.
143. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 911.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 912. In arguing that the legislature is bound to act within constitutional bounds, the
court pointed toxPeople v. Gersch, which recognized the role of the legislature in altering the
common law but also recognized the court's obligation to overrule unconstitutional legislative
action. Id. (citing Gersch, 553 N.E.2d at 286-87).
146. Id. Defendants cited Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763 (Ill. 1963), Siegall v. Solomon,

166 N.E.2d 5 (Ill. 1960), and Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. 1958), cases in which the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the General Assembly's right to limit punitive damages in different
contexts. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912.
147. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912 (citing Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 326). It is commonly debated
whether punitive damages and compensatory damages should be viewed differently by the law
because of the different functions they serve-compensatory damages are intended to compensate
the plaintiff for something that he has been deprived of, whereas punitive damages are intended to
deter similar wrongful behavior in the future and are aimed at retribution. See Laura Clark Fey et
al., The Supreme Court Raised Its Voice: Are the Lower Courts Getting the Message? Punitive

Damages Trends after State Farm v. Campbell, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 807, 813 (2004) (discussing
State Farm v. Campbell, which distinguished compensatory damages and punitive damages and
held that there are constitutional limits to the government's imposition of punitive damages under
the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Consorti v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1012 (2d Cir. 1995) (reasoning that the question of whether
compensatory damages exceed what is permitted by law is not materially different from the
question of whether punitive damages exceed what is permitted by law when determining
whether to apply state or federal law); Mark Geistfeld, Access to Justice: Can Business Coexist

with the Civil Justice System?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1093, 1114-15 (2005) (describing the
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Court case specifically distinguished the treatment of punitive damages
from that of compensatory damages, and it therefore reasoned that this
line of cases had no bearing on the cap at issue. 148
In addressing comparable statutes that were upheld by the high courts
of other states, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that the other
statutes varied significantly from the one at issue in Illinois, and
because the court could not know the bases upon which those statutes
were upheld, the decisions from other states were not persuasive. 149
Although the court found that the decisions provided guidance in
making its own determination,150 it ultimately held that it could not base
its interpretation of Illinois law on the actions of other states. 15 1
Instead, the court relied on Best to reach its conclusion. 152 After
disposing of the defendants' challenges to Best, the Lebron court
applied the dicta from that case and held that the limitation on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases was
unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers clause of
the Illinois Constitution. 153 The court held that remittitur has been a
traditional and inherent power of the judiciary for over a century and
that the determination of whether to lower a jury's award should only be
considered by the courts on a case-by-case basis. 154 The court further
held that capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases
functioned as a type of legislative remittitur that undercut the inherent
power of the judiciary to reduce excessive verdicts.155 Thus, the court
commonly held understanding of tort law that punitive damages serve the purposes of general
deterrence and private punishment as being similar to the view of compensatory damages, which
provide private compensation and general deterrence).
148. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912 (citing Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 326).
149. See id. at 913-14 (discussing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2009) and FLA. STAT. §
766.118 (2009) and reasoning that the caps in other states, as well as the separation of powers
clauses in those states, are not the same as the ones in Illinois). The court described the
California statute, which limited damages for noneconomic injuries in all medical malpractice
injuries to $250,000. Id (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b)). It also described the Florida
statute which was more complicated and could be as low as $150,000 or as high as $1.5 million
depending on the type of injury, the type of care that was being provided, and the class of the
person who was giving treatment. Id at 914 (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.118).
150. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 913-14.
151. Id at 914 (citing People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 45 (Ill. 2006)).
152. Id.; Parness, supra note 119, at 324-25.
153. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 914. (citing ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1).
154. Id. at 908 (citing Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1079 (Ill. 1997)). The
court did acknowledge that the legislature has authority to limit certain types of damages, such as
those that are recoverable based on statutory causes of action. Id. at 906 (citing Best, 689 N.E.2d
at 1079).
155. Id at 908 (citing Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078-79). The court reasoned that although the
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held that, like the 1996 cap, the 2005 cap was an unconstitutional
violation of the separation of powers clause and affirmed the trial
court's ruling that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.1 5 6
C. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion agreed with the majority that finding the
statute unconstitutional as applied to Lebron was unnecessary, and it
primarily focused on whether or not the statute was facially invalid.15 7
2005 cap operates in fewer cases than the 1996 cap, the constitutional violation was the same. Id.
156. Id. at 914-17. Before concluding, however, the court addressed the dissent's challenges
to subject matter jurisdiction for lack of ripeness and standing. Id. at 915-17. The court argued
that although subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, objections to standing and ripeness are
waived if they are not raised in a timely manner in the trial court. Id at 916 (citing Skolnick v.
Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4, 19 (Ill. 2000); In re General Order of October 11, 1990, 628
N.E.2d 786, 788 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)). The court then emphasized that the defendants Gottlieb
and Martinoz did not challenge ripeness and standing. Id. Further, although Dr. Levi-D'Ancona
did assert these affirmative defenses, the circuit court rejected his arguments based on Best. Id.
The circuit court found that the constitutionality of the damage cap was ripe for review and that
plaintiffs had a sufficient and direct interest in the application of the statute just like the plaintiffs
in Best because they had suffered from serious injuries. Id. (citing Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1066).
More importantly, the court notes that Dr. Levi-D'Ancona did not renew his challenges to
ripeness and standing. Id. The court then emphasized that under Rule 341, "points not argued in
the appellant's brief are waived." Id. (citing 210 111.2d R. 341(h)(7)). Based on this rule, the
court did not address the issues further. Id. at 916-17. See infra note 157 for a discussion of the
dissent's finding on the ripeness and standing issues raised in Lebron.
157. Id. at 921. Although it is not the focus of this Note, the dissent first vehemently argued
that the constitutional issue before the court was not properly decided because the court did not
have jurisdiction. Id. at 921-26. First, the dissent reasoned that the court should have exercised
restraint in hearing the claim ,which could still have been decided on other grounds. Id. at 92022. The dissent, labeling this a jurisprudential argument, contended that a claim cannot be heard
prematurely. Id. at 922. That is, a constitutional issue should only be resolved if it is necessary
to decide the case. Id. (discussing People v. Hampton, 867 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ill. 2007)). The
dissent asserted that plaintiffs' claim could have been resolved without addressing the
constitutional issues because the defendants could still have prevailed before a jury, making the
statutory limit on damages irrelevant. Id. The dissent argued that by answering whether the cap
was constitutional, the court violated fundamental principles that promote judicial economy and
efficiency. Id. Next, the dissent questioned justiciability because the plaintiffs lacked standing
and that the claim was not ripe for review. Id. at 922-26. It described justiciability, which
requires that the controversy be appropriate for judicial review, and pointed out it must be
concrete and definite rather than hypothetical or theoretical. Id. at 923 (citing In re M.W., 905
N.E.2d 757, 769 (Ill. 2009)). In regards to standing, the dissent contended that the person in court
must have an interest in the litigation. Id. In regards to ripeness, the dissent reasoned that timing
must be proper for the court to address an issue. Id. For instance, the "court cannot pass
judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice
App. Ct.
as to future events." Id. at 924 (citing Stokes v. Pekin Ins. Co., 698 N.E.2d 252, 254 (111.
1998)). The dissent pointed out that Dr. Levi-D'Ancona challenged ripeness and standing in the
circuit court, and even though he did not argue those issues in his brief before the Supreme Court,
the dissent asserted that the circuit court decision should have been reversed on the basis of these
issues. Id. It equated these deficiencies as lack of subject matter jurisdiction and emphasized that
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The dissent first described the damages crisis, which has prevented
millions of Americans from obtaining health care coverage.158 Citing to
a speech by President Barack Obama before a joint session of the
United States Congress, 159 the dissenting opinion described rising
medical costs as an "unsustainable burden on taxpayers" and recognized
medical malpractice reform as one of many potential remedies
implemented by Public Act 94-677.160
The dissent then described the broad purpose of Public Act 94677.161 It described numerous provisions that were enacted to decrease
costs of medical care and deter the health care crisis. 16 2 This was
relevant to the dissent because it demonstrated that the 2005 cap was
just one of many policy determinations over which the General
lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Id. (citing In re M W, 905 N.E.2d at 765).
Finally, the dissent cited People v. Capitol News, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ill. 1990), which
held that if a plaintiff does not have standing or if a claim is not ripe for review, the circuit court's
judgment must be set aside for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 924
(Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing CapitolNews, 560 N.E.2d at 306).
158. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 917 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
President Barack Obama, Health Care Address to Congress (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/politics/ Oobama.text.html?pagewanted= 1& r- 1).
159. Id (citing Obama, supra note 158). President Obama noted that health insurance
premiums in America have gone up three times faster than wages. Obama, supra note 158.
Further, one in three Americans go without health insurance at some point, and individuals that
become sick are often dropped from their insurance carrier or are not covered for the full cost of
care. Id. President Obama also stated, "I have talked to enough doctors to know that defensive
medicine may be contributing to unnecessary costs. So I am proposing that we move forward on
a range of ideas about how to put patient safety first and let doctors focus on practicing
medicine." Id
160. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 917-18 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Act of Aug. 25, 2005, § 101(4), Pub. Act 94-677, 2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4964-65,
invalidated by Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010)) ("This health care
crisis, which endangers the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Illinois, requires
significant reforms to the civil justice system currently endangering health care for citizens of
Illinois.") (internal citations omitted).
161. Id at 918-20 (citing § 101, 2005 Ill. Laws at 4964-65).
162. Id at 918 (citing 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 et seq. (West 2004)). The dissent
described provisions that increased oversight and reporting requirements for medical malpractice
insurance carriers, increased availability of information pertaining to physicians' criminal and
disciplinary histories, and mandated new written report requirements for physicians. Id. (citing
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/1 et seq. (West 2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1704.5

(West 2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 2004)). The court also described the
amendments to the Good Samaritan Act, which made retired physicians immune from liability
and provided more state funding for free clinics. Id. at 919 (citing 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
49/30 (West 2006)). Finally, the Act explained two separate provisions related to apologies and
explanations from health care providers after malpractice occurs-one that made these statements
inadmissible as evidence and another that funded research to evaluate their effectiveness in
promoting settlement. Id. (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-2501 (West 2006); 710 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/401 et seq. (West 2006)).
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Assembly .had power,163 including broad regulatory authority and
discretion to determine what measures would further the public
interest. 164 The dissent also argued that the power to determine public
policy rested with the General Assembly and not in the courts because
the General Assembly was uniquely positioned to gather data and
information from constituents about public opinion and the impact of
policy changes.16 5 Based on the General Assembly's authority to make
public policy, the dissent emphasized that the court has to give
substantial deference to the legislature. 166 Therefore, the party
challenging legislative action related to public policy has to overcome a
heavy burden and must clearly establish that the law violates
constitutional principles.1 67
Next, the dissent argued that the majority opinion erred in applying
Best because the determination regarding separation of powers in Best
was dicta,168 and therefore, non-binding authority that did not prevent
the court from reconsidering the issue at a later point. 1 69 Second, the
dissent argued that the statute at issue in Lebron was substantially
different from the one at issue in Best because it specifically sought to
curb rising health care costs in a focused and particular way.170
163. Id at 919-20.
164. Id (quoting Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 759 N.E.2d 533, 545 (111.2001)).
165. Id at 920. Further, the dissent pointed out that the legislature is the only branch of
government with the power to weigh competing societal, economic, and policy interests. Id.
(citing Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 866 N.E.2d 85, 110 (Ill. 2006)). Moreover, the
dissent contended that courts are poorly equipped to determine public policy because they do not
have access to all parties, facts, or issues that are relevant to a given policy, id. (citing Bd. of
Educ. of Dolton Sch. Dist. 149 v. Miller, 812 N.E.2d 688, 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)), and that
public policy is inherently political, the domain of the legislature rather than the courts. Id.
166. Id. (citing People v. McCarty, 858 N.E.2d 15, 32 (Ill. 2006)).
167. Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 415, 421 (Ill. 2007)). The dissent also
reasoned that if a court can uphold the constitutionality of a statute, it has an obligation to do so
on the basis of this presumption. Id. (citing Napleton v. Vill. of Hinsdale, 891 N.E.2d 839, 846
(2008)).
168. Id. at 926-27. The dissent discussed the concurring opinion from Best written by Justice
Michael A. Bilandic, which acknowledged that the separation of powers analysis was dicta. Id.
(citing Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1106 (Ill. 1997)) ("I write separately to
state that I do not join in the majority's discussion of the constitutionality of the damages cap
under the separation of powers doctrine as that discussion is wholly unnecessary and constitutes
dicta.").
169. Id. at 926 (citing Geer v. Kadera, 671 N.E.2d 692, 699 (Ill. 1996)); Exelon Corp. v. Dep't
of Revenue, 917 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. 2009)).
170. Id. According to the dissenting opinion, the statute at issue in Best was distinguishable
as a comprehensive tort reform package that applied broadly to all common law claims, whereas
the statute at issue in Lebron was a focused attempt to address the health care crisis. Id.
(discussing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1(a) (West 1996), invalidated by Lebron v.

Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010)).
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Therefore, according to the dissent, the Best analysis was inappropriate
because statutes that differ from their predecessors should be given new
consideration rather than a blind application of stare decisis. 17 1
Finally, the dissent argued that stare decisis does not definitively or
absolutely preclude reconsideration of an issue. 172 In fact, the court
must correct its mistakes no matter how long or how many times it has
been upheld. 173 Based on this mandate, the dissent addressed the
argument that caps on damages are a legislative form of remittitur that
violate the separation of powers doctrine. 174 First, the dissent argued
that remittitur is not an inherent function of the judiciary because it was
not established in the U.S. Constitution and was not incorporated into
American law until 1822.175 The dissent also pointed out that judicial
remittitur has been questioned in the Supreme Court and was even held
unconstitutional in Missouri on the basis that it violates the right to a
trial by jury,176 supporting the conclusion that remittitur is
constitutionally suspect and not an inherent power of the judiciary.1 7 7
The dissent then argued that even if remittitur is an inherent function
of the judiciary, the 2005 cap was not a form of remittitur because if a
court applied the cap, it would not have reexamined the jury's verdict or
its factual determinations but implemented a public policy decision to
reduce liability based on what was sustainable for the health care
system.1 7 8 The dissent emphasized that this was not meant to replace
the jury's determination as to what was reasonable but to prevent high
171. Id. at 926-27 (discussing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 429 (Ohio
2007)). The court in Arbino was also reviewing legislation that was tailored to address the
constitutional defects of a previous tort reform package. Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 429-30. While
there was precedent that supported invalidating the statute on the basis that it violated separation
of powers, the court found that the case required a fresh review because it was "more than a
rehashing of unconstitutional statutes." Id.
172. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 927 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
doctrine of stare decisis is never an inexorable command.").
173. Id. (citing People v. Colon, 866 N.E.2d 207, 219 (Ill. 2007)). The dissent acknowledged
that stare decisis is important to the stability of the law. Id. However, it emphasized that stare
decisis must be set aside where it would harm the public interest or where the prior reasoning is
unworkable or unsound. Id. (citing Tuite v. Corbitt, 866 N.E.2d 114, 124 (Ill. 2006)).
174. Id at 927-32.
175. Id at 927-28 (citing Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (D. Mass. 1822)). See supra notes 7374 and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of the case history regarding remittitur.
176. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 928 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484 (1935); Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp., 693
S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)).
177. Id. Specifically, the dissent stated that remittitur is not an essential part of the judiciary's
power as granted to courts in the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Id.
178. Id. (citing Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1277-78 (D. Kan. 2003)).
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damages as a matter of public policy. 179 Further, the dissent noted that
every state addressing this issue after Best, as well as the federal courts,
rejected the Best separation of powers analysis, finding that caps on
damages are not a form of legislative remittitur.18 0 Although such a
decision should not be made based on popularity, the dissent reasoned
that it is beneficial to learn from others who provide persuasive legal
analysis.18 1
The dissent contended that the separation of powers analysis from
Best was also incorrect and should not have been applied in Lebron
because it failed to recognize the General Assembly's power to repeal
or change the common law. 182 According to the dissent, this power
supersedes the judiciary's authority over the common law and justifies
the General Assembly's power to limit damages as a function of public
policy. 183 Finally, the dissent affirmed that the separation of powers
179. Id "[R]eduction of an award to comport with legal limits does not involve substitution
of the court's judgment for that of the jury, but rather is a determination that a higher award is not
permitted as a matter of law . . . ." Id. (citing Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d
1320, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 1999)).
180. Id. at 928-30. The dissent cited to a Note written by a Northwestern University Law
School student contending that the court's separation of powers analysis in Best would be a
powerful weapon for those who opposed caps on damages. Id. at 929 (citing Fink, supra note 59,
at 272)). According to the dissent, "the weapon proved to be a dud." Id. The dissent then cited
numerous state cases holding that caps on damages are not legislative remittitur and are a valid
exercise of legislative authority. Id. (citing Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1055
(Alaska 2002); Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/Healthone, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 581-82
(Colo. 2004); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1122 (Idaho 2000); Gourley ex
rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 77 (Neb. 2003); Rhyne v. KMart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 10 (N.C. 2004); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 421, 44445 (Ohio 2007); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 145 (Utah 2004); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency
Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 317 (Va. 1999); Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406,
413 (W. Va. 2001); Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 725 A.2d 579, 596 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999),
abrogatedby John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 800 A.2d 727 (Md. 2002); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657
N.W.2d 721, 737 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Waste Disposal Ctr., Inc. v. Larson, 74 S.W.3d 578, 590
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 623 N.W.2d 776, 786 (Wis. Ct. App.
2000)).
181. Lebron, N.E.2d at 930 (quoting Sophocles, Antigone (trans. Elizabeth Wyckoff), in THE
COMPLETE GREEK TRAGEDIES VOL. 2. 159 (David Gene & Richmond Lattimore eds., 1960)).
182. Id.
183. Id at 930-31. For this proposition, the dissent cited to the Illinois Common Law Act,
which states in relevant part that "[tlhe common law of England . .. shall be the rule of decision,
and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority." Id. (citing 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (West 2008)). Further, the dissent discussed the Illinois Constitution,
which dictates that the General Assembly has legislative authority in Illinois. Id. (citing ILL.
CONST. of 1970 art. IV, § 1). Finally, the dissent showed that even the Illinois Supreme Court has
recognized the authority of the General Assembly to eliminate or change the common law. Id.
The court has held that "[t]he Illinois General Assembly has the inherent power to repeal or
change the common law, or do away with all or part of it." Id. (citing People v. Gerasch, 553
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clause of the Illinois Constitution was to be interpreted based on the
Illinois framers' intent, but it emphasized that this did not prevent the
court from considering the decisions of other states regarding similar
laws, which are useful and appropriate for deciding similar cases in

Illinois. 184

Thus, the dissent argued that the 2005 cap should have been found
constitutional because the separation of powers analysis from Best was
non-binding dicta, the 2005 cap was not a legislative remittitur, and
even if it was, remittitur is not an inherent judicial function.

IV. ANALYSIS
The decision in Lebron reinforced Illinois's position as the only state
that views legislative caps on damages as an unconstitutional violation
of the separation of powers. 185 Moreover, it made this interpretation
binding precedent, 186 whereas it had previously only been judicial
dicta.' 87 Although the court addressed Unzicker in its opinion, it did
not recognize the contradiction between Unzicker and Best when it
relied on Best to find the 2005 cap unconstitutional.1 8 8
Accordingly, this Part critiques the court's finding in Lebron and
argues that the 2005 cap was not an unconstitutional violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. First, this Part focuses on the separation
of powers analysis in Best, arguing that it was erroneous and that
Lebron should not have applied it to the 2005 cap.189 This Part then
N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ill. 1990)). The dissent noted that the General Assembly's power to limit
common law remedies is itself limited by article I, section 12 of the Illinois Constitution. Id.
(citing ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 12). However, the dissent argued that this has not stopped
the court from upholding the General Assembly's authority to limit the time in which actions can
be brought, raising the standard of care for tort liability, and restricting the type or amount of
damages a party may recover. Id. (citing Bilyk v. Chi. Transit Auth., 531 N.E.2d 1, 7 (111.1988)).
184. Id. at 932. The dissent cited to numerous Illinois cases in which the court found it
appropriate to analyze applicable legal conclusions from other state courts. Id. (citing, for
example, People v. Pawlaczyk, 724 N.E.2d 901, 912 (Ill. 2000); P.R.S. Int'l, Inc. v. Shred Pax
Corp., 703 N.E.2d 71, 78 (Ill. 1998)).
185. See Goldhaber & Grycz, supra note 94, at 21 (describing the strong ruling in Lebron as a
serious blow to the effort for caps on noneconomic damages and stating that it may be the last
word from the Illinois Supreme Court on the issue).
186. See Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 908-17 (holding that the 2005 cap was unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution).
187. Id at 906-07; Parness, supranote 119, at 324.
188. See infra notes 258-259 and accompanying text (arguing that Best and Unzicker
contradicted each other because Best held that limits to liability were never permissible because
of the separation of powers clause, whereas Unzicker upheld a statute that limited a defendant's
liability).

189. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that damage caps are not a form of legislative remittitur and
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contends that the Lebron court erred because it did not give adequate
consideration to the General Assembly's power to modify or eliminate
the common law when it struck down the 2005 cap as
unconstitutional. 190 Finally, this Part analyzes the weight that Lebron
should have given the Best separation of powers analysis in light of the
fact that it was non-binding dicta, 19 1 and asserts that this analysis is
significantly outweighed by the strong presumption favoring a statute's
constitutionality. 192
A. The SeparationofPowers Analysisfrom Best Was Erroneous

The Lebron court heavily relied on Best to find that statutory caps on
damages are unconstitutional. This Subpart argues that such reliance
was misguided because damage caps are inherently very different from
judicial remittitur based both upon their function and effect.1 93 Even if
a damage cap is a legislative remittitur, however, this Subpart describes
the historical development of remittitur and its treatment by the
American court system to show that remittitur is not an inherent
function of the judiciary.194 To reinforce these two arguments, this
Subpart explains that every other state that has considered this issue has
found that damage caps do not violate the separation of powers
doctrine. 195
1. Damage Caps are Not a Form of Legislative Remittitur
The Lebron majority's application of Best is problematic because the
holding in Best is itself problematic: the conclusion that the General
Assembly unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers clause
when it passes a statutory cap on damages incorrectly assumes that caps
are a form of legislative remittitur. Those who vehemently oppose
damage caps have occasionally done so based in part on the grounds
that they violate the separation of powers doctrine. 196 They favor total
that remittitur is not an inherent function of the judiciary as has been recognized by numerous
other states).
190. See infra Part IV.B.
191. See infra Part Iv.C.
192. See infra Part IV.D.
193. See infra Part IV.A.1.
194. See infra Part IV.A.2.
195. See infra Part IV.A.3.
196. See Edward J. Kionka, Things to Do (Or Not) to Address the Medical Malpractice

Insurance Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 469, 502-03 (2006) (arguing that because remittitur
must be considered on a case-by-case basis, legislative damage caps violate separation of
powers); Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform's Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J.
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independence of the judiciary in this area of law, and they typically do
not give adequate weight to the role of checks and balances in our
system of government.197 The Illinois Supreme Court has long rejected
the notion that each branch of government should exercise its authority
completely independent of the other branches.198 Instead, it is well
recognized that the three branches of government have shared and
overlapping powers.199 Thus, merely exercising a similar function of
government is not sufficient to constitute a separation of powers
835, 917 (2002) (arguing that the judiciary needs independence from the legislature). Peck argues
that history demonstrates the purpose of separation of powers and that letting the judiciary have
too much power will essentially lead to authoritarianism. Peck, supra,at 917; accord Fink, supra
note 59, at 268-69 (arguing that the remittitur analysis from Best is powerful and could be
applied in other states to find statutory caps on damages unconstitutional). David Fink argued
that all thirteen states that have upheld the constitutionality of damage caps on noneconomic
damages did not address a possible separation of powers violation. Fink, supra note 59, at 268.
However, Fink conveniently failed to acknowledge a recent case in the Supreme Court of
Virginia, which held that remittitur was an entirely different function than damage caps. Pulliam
v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 313 (Va. 1999). In part on that
basis, the court rejected the claim that statutory limits on damages violated separation of powers.
Id. Further, since Fink's article was published, at least six state supreme court cases have upheld
damage caps despite a challenge on the basis of separation of powers. Evans ex rel. Kutch v.
State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1055 (Alaska 2002); Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/Healthone,
L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 581-82 (Colo. 2004); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1122
(Idaho 2000); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 77
(Neb. 2003); Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 10 (N.C. 2004); Verba v. Ghaphery, 552
S.E.2d 406, 411 (W. Va. 2001). Although there are several states that have not addressed
remittitur arguments at all, every state other than Illinois that has addressed this question has
rejected the analysis and conclusion from Best. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d
895, 929-30 (Ill. 2010) (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A federal court,
applying Maryland state law, has also rejected this premise. Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704
F.Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989).
197. People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 892 (Ill. 1988); Gillespie v. Barrett, 15 N.E.2d 513,
514 (Ill. 1938); see also Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 623 N.W.2d 776, 786 (Wis. Ct. App.
2000) (arguing that even if the caps on damages are a type of remittitur, the sharing of powers
between the three branches of government has always been upheld in Wisconsin). The federal
separation of powers framework also demonstrates that there needs to be certain shared powers
between the three branches of government. See Morton Rosenberg, Congress'sPrerogativeover
Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's

Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627, 634 (1989) (arguing that the
American political system involves a "delicately balanced scheme of separated but shared
powers" and that Congress was to be the dominant policymaking body in this constitutional
scheme).
198. Gillespie, 15 N.E.2d at 514; see also People ex rel. Witte v. Franklin, 186 N.E. 137, 139
(Ill. 1933) (reasoning that the separation of powers clause is not meant to be read so literally that
it prevents absolutely all overlapping between the branches of government). The court in
Gillespie stated that the "true meaning [of the separation of powers doctrine], both in theory and
in practice, is that the whole power of two or more of these departments shall not be lodged in the
same hands, whether of one or many." Gillespie, 15 N.E.2d at 514.
199. Gillespie, 15 N.E.2d at 514; Franklin, 186 N.E. at 139.
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violation; rather, the "General Assembly has the power to enact law
governing judicial practices when the laws do not unduly infringe upon
the inherent powers of the judiciary." 200
Remittitur originated as a means for the judge to limit damages when
it believed that the jury's award was unreasonable and against the
manifest weight of evidence. 201 Still, assessments of damages are
primarily a determination for the jury, and the court's authority to
intervene is limited solely to instances where the jury award is
excessive. 20 2 Notably, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that
remittitur requires a case-by-case determination of what damages are
reasonable. 2 0 3 In contrast, the General Assembly enacted the 2005 cap
in a way that made such a determination unnecessary; the cap was a
prospective blanket policy applicable to all cases irrespective of the
facts in an effort to lower costs to the health care system. 20 4 Remittitur
200. People v. Davis, 442 N.E.2d 855, 860 (Ill. 1982) (citing People v. Youngbey, 413 N.E.2d
416, 419 (111.1980)); see also Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 908 (holding that the 2005 cap was an
encroachment of the judiciary's inherent power of remittitur).
201. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1079-80 (Ill. 1997); David Baldus et al.,
Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposalfor the Comparative
Additur/Remittitur Review ofAwards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA
L. REv. 1109, 1119 (1995). Remittitur can only be utilized if there is a problem with the jury's
fact finding or evidence that the jury acted with passion or prejudice against the defendant.
Sandra Sperino, JudicialPreemption of Punitive Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 227, 256 (20092010).
202. Philip H. Corboy et al., Illinois Courts: Vital Developers of Tort Law As Constitutional
Vanguards, Statutory Interpreters,and Common Law Adjudicators, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 183,
209-10 (1999). The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held that the jury is responsible for
determining damages because it is a question of fact. Lee v. Chi. Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493,
509-10 (Ill. 1992); Baird v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 349 N.E.2d 413, 417-18 (Ill.
1976); Corboy, supra, at 209-10. Great weight must be given to the jury's determination.
Snelson v. Kamm, 787 N.E.2d 796, 816 (Ill. 2003). Although there is substantial authority
behind the judiciary's right to determine damages, remittitur ensures the longevity of the jury
even when some juries misbehave. Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 F.2d 475, 478 (5th Cir.
1951) (quoting William Blackstone's Commentaries).
203. Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621, 628 (Ill. 1997); Fink, supranote 59, at 232-33
(citing Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860: THE CRISIS

OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 2 (1978)) (arguing that judicial remittitur is based on the manifest weight
of evidence, a fact-based determination); Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the
HorizontalForce of Precedent,78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1075, 1151 (2003); see also Best, 689
N.E.2d at 1079-82 (citing Haid v. Tingle, 579 N.E.2d 913, 914-16 (111. App. Ct. 1991))
(describing how the court remitted damages based on its determination that the jury award was
excessive). Even the majority opinion in Lebron recognized that remittitur requires a focused
examination of the facts of each case. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 906 (citing Best, 689 N.E.2d at
1080). Because the historical premise for remittitur is based on the need to correct aberrant errors
of the jury, clearly remittitur can only be exercised on a case-by-case basis. Fink, supra note 59,
at 242.
204. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1706.5 (2010), invalidated by Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1
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inherently involves weighing evidence, 2 0 5 and the absence of such a
case-by-determination differentiates the basic function of the 2005 cap
from the function of remittitur. 206 Indeed, the cap had a legislative
effect and purpose that applied prospectively to all citizens and all
cases, such that the cap was more analogous to the legislative repeal of
a cause of action or its corresponding remedies. 20 7
In the statute's legislative history, the General Assembly argued that
increasing medical liability insurance costs were contributing to the
increasing cost of health care. 20 8 It noted that a cap on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases was one of the many reforms that
would maintain the ability of the health care system to protect the safety
and welfare of Illinois citizens by reducing the harmful impact of
excessive damages awards. 209 Thus, the objective of the 2005 cap was
significantly different from that of judicial remittitur.21 0 Whereas
remittitur is a mechanism used to prevent jury awards that shock the
judicial conscience because they are unreasonable in light of the case,
the 2005 cap was properly within the scope of legislative power as a
policy mechanism to reduce medical liability costs to a sustainable level
and increase availability of health care in Illinois.2 1 1
Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010). The 2005 cap functioned this way because it applied "[in any
medical malpractice action or wrongful death action based on medical malpractice in which
economic and non-economic damages may be awarded." Id The circumstances of each case
were irrelevant under the 2005 cap. See id. (applying to all medical malpractice actions and
describing the policy justifications for enacting the cap).
205. Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 761-72 (D. Mass, 1822). Justice Story described the
exercise of remittitur as one "of discretion full of delicacy and difficulty." Id. at 761-72. He
described the careful process of weighing evidence that justified his determination. Id.
206. The 2005 cap is inherently different from remittitur because it does not require the jury to
act against the manifest weight of evidence; indeed, the cap could have applied where a jury
reasonably and justifiably awarded damages in excess of the cap. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21706.5 (2010) (stating that the statute would apply to "any" jury award), invalidatedby Lebron v.
Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010).
207. See Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (D. Md. 1989) (finding that
because the legislature has the power to "define, augment, or even abolish complete causes of
action," the legislature also has the "power to define by statute what damages may be
recovered"); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1122 (Idaho 2000) (citing
Franklin, 704 F. Supp. at 1331) (drawing a distinction between prospective legislative action that
applies to all parties and an individualized judicial determination).
208. Act of Aug. 25, 2005, § 101, Pub. Act 94-677, 2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4964-65, invalidated
by Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010).
209. Id.
210. See Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 927 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that caps on damages are not a determination of what is reasonable but what is allowable
as a matter of policy).
211. Lees, supra note 3, at 232 (discussing the findings of REFORM Now, supra note 1,at 28).
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The opposing viewpoint is that remittitur and caps on damages have
the same effect, making them practically the same exercise of power: in
both cases, the government is reducing the amount of damages a
plaintiff recovers. 212 However, the question of whether the General
Assembly infringes on the inherent power of the judiciary is a question
about the power itself and not the effects of exercising that power. 2 1 3
Remittitur also functions only when the plaintiff agrees to it because
the judge, after making the factual determination of what amount is
reasonable, gives the plaintiff a choice between accepting that amount
and proceeding to a new trial. 214 This was not the case with the 2005
cap, which was enacted by the General Assembly to apply to all cases
irrespective of the parties' wishes or the jury's findings. 215 This
prospective application of the 2005 cap differed from the retrospective
judicial function of remittitur, and the 2005 cap therefore did not
displace the judiciary's power to determine whether the jury award was
fair and reasonable in each particular case. 216
2. Remittitur is Not an Inherent Power of the Judiciary
Moreover, the historical development and constitutional challenges to
the judiciary's exercise of remittitur clearly show that the function is not
an inherent power of the judiciary. 217 The Illinois Constitution did not
explicitly give the judiciary power to remit jury awards. 218
212. Stephen B. Presser, Separation of Powers and Civil Justice Reform: A Crisis of
Legitimacy for Law and Legal Institutions, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 649, 656 (2000-2001)

(describing the conclusion in Best as being premised on the idea that the legislature took away the
judiciary's remittitur role when it reduced damages).
213. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. II, § 1 (stating that no branch shall exercise the power that
belongs to another).
214. Murphy, supra note 203, at 1151; Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and

Additur, 44 YALE L.J. 318, 319-20 (1934).
215. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1706.5 (2010) (stating that the jury "shall" be informed of the
2005 cap), invalidatedby Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (111.2010).
216. See Lees, supra note 3, at 232 (arguing that courts still have the power of remittitur even
when damages are capped). Instead, the cap on damages set an "outer parameter by which
wholly subjective damages are limited." Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1080
(Ill. 1997) (discussing the argument made by the Best appellants).
217. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the historical development of
remittitur).
218. Not only does the Illinois Constitution not grant the power to remit jury awards to the
judiciary, but also the exercise of remittitur is constitutionally suspect. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at
928 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 73-74 and
accompanying text. This is relevant because the Illinois Supreme Court often looks to whether
the Illinois Constitution provides a particular power to a branch of government in determining
whether that power is inherent. See, e.g., People ex rel. Baricevic v. Wharton, 556 N.E.2d 253,
257 (Ill. 1990) (stating that the judiciary has inherent authority to administer and supervise the
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Furthermore, other state and federal courts-which are persuasive but
not binding on Illinois courts 219-have not always exercised the power
of remittitur, and since it was incorporated into American law in 1822,
the constitutionality of remittitur has been questioned by courts and
challenged by legal scholars as a violation of the right to a trial by
jury. 220 Ultimately, remittitur was accepted as a legitimate judicial
function because it was applied by the lower courts for many years-not
on the basis that the judiciary had an inherent power to exercise it.22 1
Although it is now widely accepted that remittitur does not violate the
right to a trial by jury, 222 its checkered past demonstrates that it is far
from being an inherent power of the judiciary. 223
The duration for which judicial remittitur has now been upheld in the
federal courts has widely been used to argue that remittitur is an
inherent judicial function-a proposition which inaccurately conflates
two distinct issues. 2 24 While the duration of time for which a power has
court system in part because Illinois Constitution specifically vests this power in the court);
Polich v. Chi. Sch. Fin. Auth., 402 N.E.2d 247, 251 (Ill. 1980) (stating that the power to tax was
firmly in the General Assembly because it was an inherent power and was specifically granted in
the Constitution).
219. People v. Fern, 607 N.E.2d 951, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
220. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of these
questions and challenges to remittitur: Numerous legal scholars have also challenged the
constitutionality of remittitur. Fink, supra note 59, at 238-39. Professor Irene Deaville Sann
argues that tradition is not sufficient to justify the continue practice of remittitur and that it should
therefore be abolished. Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (andAdditurs) in the Federal Courts: An
Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 157, 172, 221 (1988).

According to Sann, tradition should not prevent the Court from upholding the constitution no
matter how engrained a particular practice may be. Id. Further, Professor Leo Carlin has argued
that remittitur is unconstitutional because it undermines the right of the judiciary to award
damages. Leo Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 24 (1942). Fink argued
that remittitur's suspect constitutionality actually weakens the case for legislative caps. Fink,
supra note 59, at 298. Fink argued that if judicial remittitur was unconstitutional, it would in fact
mean that the legislature could not limit damages either. Id
221. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,483(1935).
222. The Illinois Supreme Court has established that remittitur is constitutional in Illinois.
Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621, 628 (Ill. 1997).
223. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 928 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1079-80 (Ill. 1997) (arguing that
remittitur is an inherent judicial function because it has been upheld in federal courts for over a
century); Corboy, supra note 202, at 209-10 (asserting that Illinois courts are to use remittitur
"by tradition, and as an inherent power of the judicial branch"). In Best, the court merely cited to
a U.S. Supreme Court case that remitted a jury award to support the proposition that remittitur is
inherent to the judiciary. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1079 (citing Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 412
(1896)).

The court also cited to and discussed Dimick, which itself questioned the

constitutionality of remittitur. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing the
Dimick Court's analysis of remittitur as being constitutionally suspect). Similarly, Corboy cited
to Richardson, 676 N.E.2d at 628 (Ill. 1997), to support this proposition, but the Richardson court
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been exercised may support a finding that the power is inherent, it is not
sufficient to warrant such a conclusion because an inherent power is
plainly one that is critical to the exercise of all other powers. 225 This
element is crucial to understanding why remittitur is not inherent to the
judiciary as courts are able to administer justice and execute their other
powers without the exercise of judicial remittitur. 226 Even if remittitur
did not exist, the court could still administer justice by ordering a new
trial without the alternative of accepting a lower damage award.22 7
3. The Lebron Court Did Not Give Adequate Weight to the Separation
of Powers Analyses from Other States
The Lebron holding also came as a surprise because the majority of
states that have addressed statutes similar to the 2005 cap found that
damage caps are constitutional. 228 Of these states, several have
specifically found that caps on damages are not comparable to
legislative remittitur and do not violate the separation of powers.229
merely applied the remittitur doctrine without holding that it was inherent to the judiciary. See
Richardson, 676 N.E.2d at 628-29 (finding that it was appropriate to remit the jury award to an
amount that did not depart from the record).
225. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (holding that that inherent
powers are "those which are necessary to the exercise of all others") (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted). The Roadway Express Court identified a contempt sanction as a
prominent inherent power because it is necessary to maintain order and dignity in the court. Id.
The court then concluded that assessing attorney's fees against counsel is an inherent judicial
function because that power is necessary for the court to manage its own affairs. Id. at 765.
226. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 483.
227. See Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 761 (D. Mass. 1822) (implementing a remittitur on the
grounds that the court could otherwise order a new trial anyway). The court has always been able
to order a new trial if it found the damage award excessive, and remittitur was merely a
modification of that principle because it gave the plaintiff the choice between a new trial and
accepting a lower damage award. See id
228. CAPS ON DAMAGES, supra note 15.
229. Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1055 (Alaska 2002); Garhart ex rel. Tinsman
v. Columbia/Healthone, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 581-82 (Colo. 2004); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty.
Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1121-22 (Idaho 2000); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health
Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 76 (Neb. 2003); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 145 (Utah 2004);
Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406, 411 (W. Va. 2001); Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 725 A.2d
579, 590-92 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), abrogated by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 800 A.2d 727
(Md. 2002); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). Of these eight
cases, four specifically identified and rejected the reasoning from Best. E.g., Gourley, 663
N.W.2d at 76; Owens-Corning,725 A.2d at 590-92. In Gourley, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
acknowledged Best's finding that damage caps impermissibly give the legislature power to remit
verdicts and judgments. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 76. However, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
pointed out the overwhelming number of courts that have found that damage caps do not violate
separation of powers. Id. It then argued in favor of this analysis because damage caps do not
function as legislative remittitur. Id. The court argued that damage caps do not require the
legislature to evaluate a case and determine the amount of damages. Id. Rather, it is a limit to
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Although the opponents of caps argue that other states do not dictate
Illinois law, 2 30 the Illinois Supreme Court has on numerous occasions
considered the findings of other states to inform its conclusion. 23 1
These conclusions should be considered in Illinois because the statutes
at issue and the separation of powers clauses of those states are similar
to both the 2005 cap and Illinois separation of powers clause,
demonstrating that the conclusions of the high courts in those states
would not only have been reasonable but the most appropriate outcome
in Lebron.232 These decisions also represent the reality that surging
jury awards need to be remedied and that the legislature is the most
appropriate government body to deal with such policy.
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that remittitur was not the
same as a damage cap because they do not apply in the same
circumstances. 23 3 A court only applies remittitur after it determines
that,, based on an excessive jury award, the defendant did not receive a
fair and proper jury trial, whereas the cap is applied after a proper
trial. 234 Further, the cap on damages does not coincide with a right to a
new trial, as is the case with remittitur.235 Similarly, the Supreme Court
recovery as a matter of policy without regard to individual facts. Id at 77. As a result of this
distinction, the court held that the damage cap in Nebraska did not violate its separation of
powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution. Id.
230. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010); Best, 689 N.E.2d at
1077-78.
231. See, e.g., People v. Pawlaczyk, 724 N.E.2d 901, 912 (Ill. 2000) (reasoning that decisions
from other jurisdictions and law reporters supported the court's determination); P.R.S. Int'l, Inc.
v. Shred Pax Corp., 703 N.E.2d 71, 78 (Ill. 1998) ("We also find support in the judgments of
other state courts which have reached the same conclusion in construing similar rules.").
232. The court can rely on the analysis of sister states because of the profound underlying
similarities between the states. Devlin, supra note 54, at 1264-65. Although there are small
differences between the text of state constitutions and the historical circumstances in which those
constitutions were drafted, these small differences do not overcome the basic similarities in which
the constitutions were drafted. Id. at 1265. Ten state constitutions follow the federal framework
by not expressly requiring separation of powers. Id. at 1236. Twelve states expressly dictate that
there should be separation of powers, and the remaining states expressly mandate separation of
powers doctrine and go even further by stating that no person exercising power under one branch
can hold office or exercise power under another branch. Id. at 1236-37. This is one of numerous
differences between the state constitutions; however, despite the differences, all states share the
same basic separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 1236-41. According to Devlin, these
fundamental similarities overcome the textual differences and warrant comparison between states
when evaluating allocation of powers between branches in state government. Id. at 1264-65.
Notably, most state court decisions that address separation of powers cite and rely on the
determinations of other states. Id. at 1241.
233. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 313 (Va.
1999).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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of Idaho held that damage caps do not infringe upon the power of the
judiciary even if they limit the rights of plaintiffs. 236 The court
emphasized the similarity between damage caps and other legislative
modifications to the common law such as statutes of limitations, statutes
of repose, and the creation of new causes of action. 237 The court found
that the relevant damage cap did not violate the separation of powers
because it was not a form of remittitur and was nothing more than a
change to the common law. 238
The Lebron majority argued that the statutes in other states vary
widely, making them inapplicable. 239 However, this argument dodged
the fact that the other state supreme courts have still asked the same
question: Is a statutory limit on damages a legislative remittitur that
impermissibly violates the separation of powers clause of the state
constitution? 240 Contrary to the finding in Best, damage caps are not a
legislative remittitur, and Illinois is greatly outnumbered by those states
that have reached this conclusion. 241
236. Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1122 (Idaho 2000).
237. Id.
238. Id. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also determined in Verba v.
Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001), that legislative caps on damages do not violate the
separation of powers doctrine because of the legislature's power to abrogate the common law. Id.
at 410-11. The Illinois General Assembly's authority to change the common law and the Illinois
separation of powers clause are substantially similar to those in other states, so the court in
Lebron should have considered them more closely in its conclusion. See People v. Gersch, 553
N.E.2d 281, 286 (111.1990) ("The Illinois General Assembly has the inherent power to repeal or
change the common law, or do away with all or part of it."). Similarly, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that the "common law may be modified or repealed by the General
Assembly." Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 8 (N.C. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted). Also, the Illinois Constitution states that "[t]he legislative, executive
and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise power properly belonging to
another." ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. II, § 1. This provision is very similar to the North Carolina
Constitution, which states that "[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the
State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6.
However, the North Carolina Constitution even goes one step further, stating that "[tihe General
Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that
rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government ..... N.C. CONST. art. IV,
§ 1. This specifically limits the General Assembly in North Carolina; yet, the North Carolina
Supreme Court still rejected the separation of powers analysis and held that a statutory limit on
damages was not legislative remittitur. Rhyne, 594 S.E.2d at 9.
239. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 913 (Ill. 2010).
240. See, e.g., Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/Healthone, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 575
(Colo. 2004) (explaining that the HCAA damage caps do not infringe impermissibly on judicial
remittitur, nor do they violate separation of powers); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d
1115, 1116 (Idaho 2000) (explaining that the court intended to answer the question of whether the
statute violated the separation of powers clause).
241. Not only can the court consider the analysis of sister states as one of many factors in its
determination, but it should rely on relevant precedent from other states as persuasive authority.
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The findings and analyses from other state courts in similar cases
based on similar separation of powers clauses indicate that the
conclusion in Best was assailable and could be overturned as unsound
reasoning. 242 As described above, those holdings definitively explained
why remittitur is not an inherent judicial function and damage caps do
not function as a form of legislative remittitur. Considering that every
other state and federal jurisdiction to evaluate the separation of powers
analysis from Best has rejected it, 243 it is astonishing that the Lebron
court reaffirmed it, and it is evident that the Lebron holding was
misguided. 244
B. The GeneralAssembly Has Power to Abrogate or Eliminate the
Common Law

It is a foundational principle of Illinois law that the General
Assembly has the authority to eliminate or change the common law
when it sees a policy justification for doing so, and this principle has
long been upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court. 245 The Illinois General
Assembly has on numerous occasions modified the common law,
including some modifications that affect the plaintiffs right to recover
for common law claims such as the imposition of statutes of limitation,
the statute of repose, the Good Samaritan Act, and Worker's
Compensation Act. 246 The General Assembly's authority to change or
Devlin, supra note 54, at 1264-65.
242. Lees, supra note 3, at 227; see also Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 931-32 (Karmeier, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that although the court's view of the separation
of powers doctrine should be dictated by the intent of the framers of the Illinois Constitution,
"[t]he preeminence of that intent . . . does not preclude reference to how other courts have
analyzed similar provisions under similar circumstances").
243. Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1331-35 (D. Md. 1989). See
generally CAPS ON DAMAGES, supra note 15 (detailing the status of damage caps within each of

the fifty states and any cases that have overturned them).
244. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 931 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also supra note 241 and accompanying text (explaining that Illinois is hopelessly outnumbered by
other states and the federal courts in the question of whether caps on damages violate separation
of powers).
245. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (2010) (giving the legislative authority the power to repeal
the common law).
246. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-213(b) (2010) (limiting the time within which a
cause of action could be brought in products liability cases); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-214.3(c)
(limiting the time within which a cause of action could be brought against an attorney); Good
Samaritan Act, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/1-120 (2010) (eliminating common law negligence for
certain health care professionals and individuals who voluntarily try to save the life of another);
Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/1-7 (eliminating
negligence liability in certain instances for owners of land and water areas who make these areas
available to members of the public). The court has rarely interfered with the legislature's right to
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eliminate the common law is reinforced by the conclusions of other
states, which have strongly affirmed this power when upholding the
constitutionality of damage caps. 2 47
Indeed, the General Assembly has authority over the common law
because it is uniquely positioned to make policy decisions. 248 As the
former Illinois Supreme Court Chief Justice Michael A. Bilandic once
stated, public policy "should emanate from the legislature . .. [because]

it is the only entity with the power to weigh and properly balance the
many competing societal, economic, and policy considerations
involved." 24 9 The General Assembly can access resources and
information that are unavailable to the judiciary, and it hears the needs
and desires of the people, enabling it to weigh the costs and benefits of
various policies. 250
Most importantly, the General Assembly
rules
that it determines will prevent problems in
prospectively creates
tort law, whereas courts are limited to ruling based on circumstances
that have already occurred and brought the parties to court.2 5 1 This
difference enables the legislature to better avoid public harms and to
provide "fair notice" to those who are affected.2 5 2 Thus, the judiciary
should give significant deference to the General Assembly's authority to
change the common law when such authority is used to affect public
policy-something the Lebron court failed to do when it invalidated

change the common law. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Illinois Tort Law: A Rich History of
Cooperationand Respect Between the Courts and the Legislature,28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 745, 753-

55 (1997); see also Mega v. Holy Cross Hosp., 490 N.E.2d 665, 669-71 (111. 1986) (finding that
the statute of repose is constitutional because it only restricts when the action is brought and does
not eliminate the cause of action altogether).
247. Kevin J. Gfell, The Constitutionaland Economic Implications ofa National Cap on NonEconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REv. 773, 789 (2004); see also

supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text (discussing other state supreme court cases that held
damage caps were not an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers but were an exercise
of the legislative authority to change the common law).
248. Schwartz, supra note 246, at 751; Lisa Raufer, Education-StateSupreme Court Upholds
School FinanceSystem as ConstitutionalUnder Article X Section 3 and Article I, Section 1 of the
Wisconsin Constitution. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N. W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000)., 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1194,

1207-08 (2001) (citing Vincent, 614 N.W.2d at 407); Andrew C. Bernasconi, Comment, Beyond
Fingerprinting:Indicting DNA Threatens Criminal Defendants' Constitutional and Statutory

Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 979, 1036 (2001).
249. Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ill. 1995).
250. Schwartz, supra note 246, at 750-52; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text
(describing the General Assembly's ability to weigh social, economic, and policy interests).
When additional information is needed to make a policy determination, the legislature can recall
witnesses, and it has broader latitude in researching policy. Schwartz, supra note 246, at 751-52.
251. Schwartz, supra note 246, at 751-52.
252. Id. at 752 (citing BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)).
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Public Act 94-677.253

Moreover, the court should have upheld the cap in Lebron based on
Unzicker, which affirmed the right of the General Assembly to restrict
when a defendant can be held liable for the entire amount of a
verdict. 25 4 Although it could be argued that the court logically focused
on Best because the 1996 cap was most similar to the 2005 cap, the
underlying question in Unzicker-whether the General Assembly can
alter the common law to reduce the liability of a defendant-is the same
question that underlay Lebron.25 5 Just like the statute at issue in
Unzicker, the 2005 cap "determines when a defendant can be held liable
for the full amount of a jury's verdict." 25 6 More importantly, the
separation of powers analysis from Unzicker-unlike Best-was part of
a binding judicial holding, and the Lebron court should have treated it
accordingly. 257
The separations of powers analyses in Best and Unzicker contradicted
each other on the question of whether the General Assembly could
reduce a defendant's liability.2 58 Best suggested that the General
Assembly had no authority to reduce civil damages, whereas Unzicker
253. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 912 (Ill. 2010) (acknowledging
that the General Assembly may change the common law, but arguing that that is not the central
issue of the case). The Lebron court says that the only question is whether the legislature's
attempt to limit damages is a violation of separation of powers. Id. However, this argument
neglects the fact that the legislature's authority over the common law is part of the separation of
powers determination. See Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 160-62 (analyzing a separation of powers
challenge in light of the General Assembly's power to change or eliminate the common law).
254. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1037-38 (Ill. 2002). For
further discussion of the presumption favoring constitutionality of statutes, see infra Part IV.D.
255. Compare Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1042 (finding that the legislature may limit "when a
defendant can be held liable for the full amount of a jury's verdict"), with Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at
908 ("Under [the 2005 cap], the court is required to override the jury's deliberative process and
reduce any noneconomic damages in excess of the statutory cap, irrespective of the particular
facts and circumstances .... ).
256. Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1042.
257. Id.; see also Parness, supra note 119, 324-25 (describing how the Lebron court
distinguished Unzicker).

258. Compare Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1042 (finding that the legislature does not violate
separation of powers by enacting a statute that limits a defendant's liability based on the
percentage of his fault regardless of the amount the jury award and the common law rule of joint
and several liability), with Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1080 (Ill. 1997)
(reasoning that the legislature cannot interfere with the judiciary's right to remit excessive
verdicts); see also Reply Brief, supra note 89, at 4 (discussing plaintiffs brief, which argued that
Best precluded the legislature from limiting liability in all circumstances, and arguing that under
this view, Best could not be reconciled with Unzicker). If Lebron's holding had been applied to
Unzicker, the Illinois Supreme would have invalidated the statute in Unzicker as well as the
Innkeeper Protection Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1-9 (2010)). Reply Brief, supra note 89, at
4.
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held that the General Assembly could reduce a defendant's liability
even if it contradicted the existing common law. 259 Therefore, when it
decided Lebron, the court could only rely on one case or the other, and
the court erred in applying Best because it gave insufficient weight to
the legislature's well-established authority to change the common
law. 260
C. The Separation ofPowersAnalysisfrom Best was Non-Binding
JudicialDicta
The majority and dissenting opinions in Lebron discuss at length
whether the separation of powers analysis from Best was judicial dictum
or obiter dictum. 2 6 1 In either case, the analysis was unquestionably
dicta because it was not essential to the court's conclusion as it had
already found that the Best cap was "special legislation" prohibited by
the Illinois Constitution. 2 62 Because the court resolved the case based
on that issue, it did not need to proceed to the separation of powers
analysis. 263 Although it seems evident that the Best separation of
powers analysis was in fact judicial dicta because it was directly
involved in the case and was briefed and argued by both parties, 264 even
judicial dictum is not binding and can be disregarded by the court in
future decisions if the analysis is erroneous. 265 As demonstrated above,
the Lebron court should not have applied Best because its separation of
powers analysis was' erroneous: remittitur is not an inherent judicial
function and damage caps do not function the same as remittitur.2 66
259. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
260. See Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 906-07, 910-11 (considering the precedential value of Best
and Unzicker and invalidating the 2005 cap on the basis of the judicial dicta from Best). See
supra Part II.A-D for a more detailed description of the propositions in Unzicker and Best.
261. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 906-07, 926 (citing Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1106).
262. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1076 (finding that the damage cap at issue in Best was special
legislation that violated the Illinois Constitution).
263. See supra notes 50, 124, and 167 (describing the separation of powers analysis in Best as
judicial dicta because the issue was not necessary to resolution of the case but was briefed by the
parties and addressed by the court); see also Matthew W. Light, Comment, Who's the Boss?:
Statutory Damage Caps, Courts, and State ConstitutionalLaw, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 315,

340-41 (2001) (criticizing the court's special legislation analysis in Best without acknowledging
the fact that the court discussed separation of powers in its holding).
264. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078 ("Plaintiffs also assert that section 2-1115.1 violates the
separation of powers clause . . . .").
265. Exelon Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 917 N.E.2d 899, 907 (Ill. 2009); Cates v. Cates, 619
N.E.2d 715, 717 (Ill. 1993).
266. The majority again tried to dodge the core issue by arguing that the defendants did not
claim that the finding in Best was erroneous. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 907. According to the
majority, the defendants merely argued that section 2-1706.5 was distinguishable from the statute
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D. The Lebron CourtDid Not Give Sufficient Weight to the Heavy
PresumptionFavoringthe Constitutionalityof Statutes

In order to evaluate Lebron, it is crucial to consider the enduring
presumption in favor of a statute's constitutionality.267 The party
challenging a statute must show that it is unconstitutional in order for
the court to reach that conclusion. 268 The court.has made this a heavy
burden and a strong presumption, and all doubts are to be resolved in
favor of the statute's validity. 269 Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme
Court has repeatedly relied on the presumption to uphold the
constitutionality of statutes. 270
Considering the separation of powers analysis above, it is clear that
rejecting this constitutional challenge to the 2005 cap would have been
reasonable. Furthermore, the court's holding in Unzicker and its dicta
in Best contradicted each other as to whether the Illinois General
Assembly could limit a plaintiffs recovery in a common law claim, and
in light of any discrepancy, Unzicker should have controlled.2 7 1
Nonetheless, the Lebron court inexplicably reached the conclusion that
the statute was unconstitutional even though it recognized the strong
presumption favoring statutes. 272 In light of the numerous legal and
policy justifications for the statute, the court simply did not afford
sufficient Weight to the presumption of constitutionality, but rather
at issue in Best. Id. Although Gottlieb and Florence Martinoz did not argue that the analysis
from Best was erroneous, Dr. Levi-D'Ancona claimed that the circuit court "erroneously
conflated the power of remittitur with a statutory limitation on damages. . . . [A] damages
limitation and a remittitur are very different animals." Brief and Appendix of DefendantAppellant Roberto Levi-D'ancona, M.D. at 37, Lebron, 930 N.E.2d 895 (Nos. 105741, 105745),
2008 WL 3857550. While this brief may not have specifically stated that Best was erroneous, it
made arguments that implied that conclusion. Id.
267. E.g., Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226, 234 (Ill. 1985); Livingston v.
Ogilvie, 250 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ill. 1969).
268. Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 395 N.E.2d 1376, 1383 (Ill. 1979).
269. See Reed v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (111.1999) (explaining that when
the legislature declares the public policy of the state by law, the judiciary must "remain silent");
see also, e.g., Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Ill. State Toll Highway Comm'n., 251 N.E.2d
253, 256-58 (111.1969) (choosing to interpret the amended version of a statute that did not
contain a constitutional violation so as to uphold the statute); Ill. Crime Investigating Comm. v.
Buccieri, 224 N.E.2d 236, 239-40 (Ill. 1967) (inferring that the General Assembly meant to
include notice and hearing requirements in a statute that enabled the circuit court to assist in
requiring attendance and testimony of witnesses so that the court could uphold the statute's
constitutionality).
270. See supra note 269 for a discussion of applicable cases.
271. See supra notes 258-259 and accompanying text (comparing Unzicker and Best).
272. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 902 (citing In re Marriage of Miller, 879 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 2007);
In re Estate of Jolliff, 771 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. 2002)).
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chose to rely solely on a tenuous separation of powers analysis based on
an erroneous application of the remittitur doctrine.
V. IMPACT

Some commentators have suggested that Lebron could be the death
knell for damage caps in Illinois. 273 This Part discusses in detail how
the decision in Lebron indeed strengthened the law against caps on
damages in Illinois. 274 The focus of this Part, however, is how Illinois
might still enact a statutory cap on damages. 2 75 First, this Part argues
that Illinois should adopt a constitutional amendment giving the General
Assembly power to enact caps on damages. 276 Second, it suggests that
a statute could be drafted without a constitutional amendment in a way
that would limit damages and still withstand constitutional scrutiny, and
it proposes how such a difficult feat might still be accomplished-even
after Lebron.277
A. The SeparationofPowers Analysisfrom Lebron Has Entrenchedthe
Illinois Supreme Court's Stance on Damage Caps and Made Any
Change Difficult
Unfortunately, the court's mistake in Lebron entrenches the
separation of powers analysis against damage caps because the court did
not leave many questions unanswered. 278 It broadly held that any
statute forcing a court to reduce damages is a form of legislative
remittitur violating the separation of powers doctrine, regardless of
whether the statute is broadly written or narrowly tailored to medical
malpractice claims. 279 Moreover, Lebron made this binding law unlike
the analysis from Best. Thus, Lebron seriously harmed the effort to
curb liability costs and control the damages crisis in Illinois. 280
273.

Goldhaber & Grycz, supra note 94, at 20-21.

274. See
275. See
276. See
277. See

infra Part V.A.
infra Part V.B-C.
infra Part V.B.
infra Part V.C.

278. Goldhaber & Grycz, supra note 94, at 19; Gunnarsson, supra note 136, at 122 (statement
of ISBA President John O'Brien) ("The court has spoken on this issue in defense of our
constitution and the role of the judiciary and juries."); Allen Adomite, Court Hands Gift to Trial
Lawyers, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 2010, at 23 (arguing that the court ended an eight year struggle for
tort reform with a single sentence).
279. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Lebron majority opinion).
280. Goldhaber & Grycz, supra note 94, at 21; see also Lynne Marek, Ill. High Court Uncaps
Medical Malpractice Damages Again, 241 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, no. 26, Feb. 9, 2010, at 4

(statement of Robert Peck, President of the Center for Constitutional Litigation) ("I would hope
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Unless Lebron is somehow reversed or overcome, high medical
malpractice jury awards will continue to add to surging health care
costs. 2 8 1 Physicians and health care professionals will continue to have
difficulty finding affordable malpractice insurance, and this cost will
drive up the price of health care for citizens of Illinois.282 Almost every
other state in the United States has enacted some statute to reduce the
costs of health care in order to increase its accessibility, but Illinois will
continue to face increasing costs and decreasing availability of health
care if it does not somehow limit medical malpractice liability. 283
B. Illinois Should Pass a ConstitutionalAmendment Giving the General
Assembly Power to Limit Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases

However, there is still a glimmer of hope for controlling these
costs. 2 84 Passing a constitutional amendment is arguably the most
difficult but also the most effective means of enacting a statutory limit
on damages. 285 Texas faced a similar predicament after the Texas
Supreme Court invalidated a statutory limit on damages in Lucas v.
United States,286 which held that such a cap was unconstitutional. 2 87 In
that the Legislature now, having gone to the well three times in Illinois, would understand that
this is a non-starter constitutionally.").
281. See supra notes 10, 13 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between
increasing jury awards and increasing health care costs generally and arguing that increased
liability forces doctors to practice defensive medicine).
282. Arancibia, supra note 4, at 136 (citing Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice
Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1986)).

283. Act of Aug. 25, 2005, § 101, Pub. Act 94-677, 2005 Ill. Laws 4964,4964-65 (stating that
reducing malpractice liability would help reduce prohibitive costs of health care), invalidatedby
Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010); June Smith Tyler, Comment,
Medical MalpracticeStatutes: Special Protectionfor a PrivilegedFew?, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 295,

307-08 (1985) (arguing that tort reform statutes reduce costs and increase availability of health
care).
284. See infra Part V.B-C (discussing other alternatives that might reduce the surging costs of
medical liability insurance).
285. Goldhaber & Grycz, supra note 94, at 21; see also FRANK KOPECKY & MARY SHERMAN
HARRIS, UNDERSTANDING THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION 59-60 (2001 ed.) (stating that

constitutions require some inflexibility to ensure that changes are properly considered).
286. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
287. Id. at 690. Lucas invalidated the Medical Liability and Insurance Act passed in 1977,
which limited noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. Michael J. Cetra, Damage
Control: Statutory Caps on Medical Malpractice Claims, State Constitutional Challenges, and
Texas'Proposition12, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 537, 551 (2003-2004). The statute limited noneconomic

damages to $500,000 in 1975 and was indexed to the Consumer Price Index. Id The court held
that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of the Texas Open Courts doctrine, which
guarantees access to the court system. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (2003)). The Open
Courts doctrine provides that "[aill courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him,
in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONST.
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response, the legislature enacted H.B. 4, another cap on damages in
medical malpractice claims. 2 88 Knowing that the Texas Supreme Court
would likely invalidate the second cap, Governor Rick Perry
successfully campaigned in support of Proposition 12, a proposed
constitutional amendment that would give the Texas legislature the
power to determine limits of liability for noneconomic damages in all
medical malpractice claims brought against health care providers. 289
Constitutions are expressions of the collective will regarding the
structure of government and the balance of powers therein; 290 they are a
mechanism to secure faith in and stability of the government.291
Although the United States Constitution is relatively brief and provides
for only the most fundamental protections, state constitutions provide
more detail and more depth, addressing many local concerns. 2 9 2 The
greater length of state constitutions can largely be attributed to the fact
that they are easier to amend or change; in fact, they are changed
frequently and have regularly been expanded to address political or
social concerns of the state. 293 This is true in Illinois where there have
been four constitutions-the latest adopted in 1970-as well as ten
successful constitutional amendments and seven unsuccessful
art. I, § 13.
288. Cetra, supra note 287, at 551.
289. Id. at 552 (citing Erica Pitzi, Proposition 12 Passes by Narrow Margin (Sept. 14, 2003)).

Proposition 12 became article IHl, section 66 of the Constitution of the State of Texas. TEX.
CONST. art. III, § 66 (2003).
290. JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 84 (Callaghan & Co. 4th ed. 1887); see also,
e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People . . . ."); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and
Elections: Implementing PopularSovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITr. L.

REV. 189, 202-10 (1990-1991) (describing Lockean theory of popular sovereignty and how the
Constitution reflects the popular will). According to Professor Gardner, the language throughout
the U.S. Constitution reflects the idea that the document represents the popular will. Id.
291. See Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (Feb. 7, 1788), in 2 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 178, 179 (Library of America 1993) [hereinafter Letter from
George Washington] (arguing that the powers granted in the U.S. Constitution were distributed
between branches of government so as to prevent oppression or abuse of power).
292. Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and
Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 275-76
(1993-1994) (citing Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes ofAmerican State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS:

J. FEDERALISM 27, 41 (1982). Lutz described the three reasons that state constitutions tend to be
longer: they spend time addressing local and county government, they address local public
concerns that arise from the Tenth Amendment residuary power, and they have been expected to
"exalt a way of life." Id. (citing Lutz, supra, at 41) (internal citations omitted).
293. There have been over 230 state constitutional conventions and 5198 state constitutional
amendments in the United States.

Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision

Revisited, 17 PuBLIUS: J.FEDERALISM 153, 162-64 (1987).
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amendment proposals to the 1970 Illinois Constitution. 294 Not only is
the Illinois Constitution flexible, but it is structured to encourage
change: the 1970 Constitution provides for an automatic proposal to
revise the constitution every twenty years. 295
State constitutional amendments are not only common, but they are
useful because they enable states to enact different policies,2 9 6 thereby
making it easier to determine which are effective and should be adopted
more expansively. 297 Further, constitutional amendments allow citizens
to check the powers of the government where it does not reflect the will
of the people or support the welfare of the state. 298 In Illinois,
294. KOPECKY & HARRIS, supra note 285, at 59; see also Kristopher N. Classen & Jack
O'Malley, Filling the Void: The Case for Repudiating and Replacing Illinois' Void Sentence
Rule, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 430-36 (2011) (discussing the development of the Illinois

Constitution as it relates to the Void Sentence Rule). Through 1985, seven constitutional
amendments were proposed to the 1970 constitution, three of which were approved. KOPECKY &
HARRIS, supra note 285, at 62; CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: AMENDMENTS AND
CONVENTIONS PROPOSED, http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/conampro.htm (last visited Apr.
21, 2012) [hereinafter "AMENDMENTS AND CONVENTIONS"]. Since 1986, there have been an

additional ten amendment proposals and seven of those proposals were approved. Id. Notably,
the 1970 constitutional convention was the sixth constitutional convention in Illinois: the other
four conventions failed to produce new constitutions. JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION
MAKING IN ILLINOIS: 1818-1970, at 138-39 (1972). There were also two failed proposals for
constitutional conventions after 1985. AMENDMENTS AND CONVENTIONS, supra. Constitutional

amendments and even constitutional conventions are commonly discussed in Illinois, and
although the Illinois Constitution is not easy to amend, it was structured to give voters the ability
to change the constitution even if the legislature is unwilling to do so. KOPECKY & HARRIS,
supra note 285, at 60.
295.

KOPECKY & HARRIS, supranote 285, at 60.

296. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing how state constitutions are often
amended to reflect political and social concerns).
297. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ("It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1141-42 (1985) (discussing the

Brandeis laboratory metaphor and the opposing viewpoints amongst judges as to what extent a
state should experiment). States are able to adopt unique provisions based on what their culture
allows or encourages; some states may be more inclined toward a given policy than others, and
the states can serve as an experiment for those policies. Hans A. Linde, E. PluribusConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 193-200 (1983-1984).
298. See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22

RUTGERS L.J. 841, 860-61 (1990-1991) (discussing the unique nature of constitutional
amendments and advocating the utilization of amendments to incorporate a broader, more modem
understanding of equality into state constitutions); see also Letter from George Washington,
supra note 291, at 179 (defending the Constitution). The ability of the people to exercise a
greater level of control over state constitutions is important because these constitutions limit state
governmental authority; this is unlike the U.S. Constitution, which primarily grants specific
federal powers. Jameson, supra note 290, at 86-88; Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw
Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 169, 178-79 (1983). Thus, the amendment process should
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government abuses of power have in the past led to the enactment of
constitutional provisions designed to check that power. 299 There have
also been constitutional amendment proposals that dealt with the
allocation of powers and amendments that addressed issues as specific
as collecting delinquent taxes or eliminating the possibility of bail in
criminal cases where life imprisonment was a possible sentence. 300
Illinois should follow Texas's example and pass a similar constitutional
amendment under the procedure and authority already enumerated in its
state constitution so that the General Assembly can enact another cap on
damages in medical malpractice cases. 30 1
It is true that reckless, hasty amendments to constitutions erode their
stability and undermine the importance of a social consensus on
values. 302 Further, any constitutional amendment carries with it selfinterest that promotes the welfare of some at the expense of others. 30 3
However, constitutions can never be perfect, and although they should
be complicated enough to ensure changes are properly considered, but simple enough to allow for
amendments to pass. KOPECKY & HARRIS, supra note 285, at 59.
299. By the late 1860s, the number of private bills proposed in the General Assembly far
outnumbered the public bills, resulting in an abdication to private interests. CORNELIUS, supra
note 294, at 56; see also People v. Meech, 101 111.200, 204 (Ill. 1881) (describing how the
government wrongly granted special privileges under the authority of the Constitution of 1848).
As a result of these abuses of power, Illinois enacted a constitutional amendment that prohibited
the legislature from enacting special legislation. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. IV, § 22 (amended
1970).
300. KOPECKY & HARRIS, supra note 285, at 62. A constitutional amendment was proposed
but failed in 1974 to reduce the governor's amendatory veto power. Id. Another amendment,
which required two non-judicial members to sit on the Courts Commission, was passed in 1998
after James Heiple of the Illinois Supreme Court refused to recuse himself from voting on the
appointment of another justice to the Commission even though Heiple knew that the appointee
would oversee an impeachment hearing against him. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. VI, § 15 (amended
Nov. 3, 1998); Jerome B. Meites & Steven F. Pflaum, JusticeJames D. Heiple: Impeachment and
the Assault on JudicialIndependence, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 741, 786 (1998).

301. See supra Part I (discussing the policy justifications for a damage cap in Illinois). The
procedure and authority for such an amendment comes from article XIV, section 3 of the Illinois
Constitution. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. XIV, § 3. It provides that amendments "may be proposed
by a petition signed by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight percent of the total
votes cast for candidates for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial election. . . . If the petition
is valid and sufficient, the proposed amendment shall be submitted to the electors at that general
election and shall become effective if approved by either three-fifths of those voting on the
amendment or a majority of those voting in the election." Id.
302. See Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and ConstitutionalChange, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1475

(1987) (advocating rigid, inflexible constitutions averse to change because they represent the
collective will of all people rather than particularized interests of some). Colantuono also argues
that inflexible constitutions promote stable constitutional law and confidence in government. Id.
at 1509.
303. Id at 1507-08.
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be resistant to reactionary change, some flexibility is important to
reflect the broad public welfare in light of empirical data and political
discourse. 304
Passing an amendment that allows the General Assembly to deal with
growing jury awards would stabilize the burgeoning liability insurance
costs and ensure more affordable health care for Illinoisans. 305
Although such an amendment would promote the interests of hospitals,
doctors, and insurance companies at the expense of those suffering
serious injury from negligent care, 306 it would slow the exodus of
capable medical practitioners from Illinois, thereby promoting the
welfare of the general public. 307 Further, a constitutional amendment
would clarify the struggle for power over damage caps between the
judiciary and the General Assembly. 308 The General Assembly is most
equipped to reflect the will of Illinois citizens, 309 and there is a mandate
from the people of Illinois to limit growing jury awards.3 10 In light of
304. KOPECKY & HARRIS, supra note 285, at 59; Kenneth Ward, Originalismand Democratic
Government, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1272 (2000); see also Judith Olans Brown et al., The
Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in ConstitutionalDissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 573, 621

(citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)) (stating that a majority of people insisted on a
flexible approach to the equal protection laws so as to reflect modem egalitarian values).
305. See Cetra, supra note 287, at 552 (explaining that the amendment granted the Texas
Legislature the authority to pass legislation capping medical malpractice damages). Although
such a constitutional amendment would be ideal for addressing the health care crisis, it is
admittedly a very difficult process. See Colantuono, supra note 302, at 1475, 1509 (discussing
the rigid nature of constitutions and the reasons for maintaining rigidity). Proposition 12, for
instance, was debated heavily and was only passed with 51% of the vote. Cetra, supra note 287,
at 552.
306. See Luke Ledbetter, "It's the [Tort System], Stupid": Consumer Deductibles: How to
More Equitably Distribute the Risks of Medical MalpracticeandAdequately Compensate Victims
Without Statutory Damage Caps, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 51, 51 (2006) (arguing that caps on

damages cause harm to injured plaintiffs, especially those who are seriously injured); Nancy S.
Marder, The Medical MalpracticeDebate: The Jury as Scapegoat, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1267,
1279-80 (2005) (arguing that a statutory cap on damages would harm low-income victims more
so than high-income victims because the latter can still receive damages for economic loss).
307. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing to several studies that showed lower
medical malpractice liability insurance rates and higher per capita rates of physicians in states that
had damage caps). Similarly, the 2005 cap was enacted to prevent physicians from leaving
Illinois. Shirley Chiu, Comment, A Critical Look at the Non-Economic Damage Cap of the
HEALTH Act of2005 and its Impact on Consumers, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 85, 95 (2005).

308. See supra Parts II.A & III.B (describing the General Assembly's three attempts to enact a
statutory limit on damages in certain circumstances and the Illinois Supreme Court's invalidation
of each attempt).
309. See supra notes 249-251 and accompanying text (discussing the General Assembly's
superior access to a breadth of information and ability to balance competing social and political
interests to reflect the will of the people).
310. See Marek, supra note 280, at 4 (quoting a statement from the American Tort Reform
Association, which argued that the Illinois Supreme Court ignored the will of the citizens as
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the overwhelming support for caps on damages that would promote the
public welfare, Illinois must pass a constitutional amendment giving the
legislature authority to enact such a cap. 311
C. The Illinois GeneralAssembly Should Enact a Statute that is
Carefully Drafted to Reduce Medical MalpracticeLiability but Survive
the Lebron SeparationofPowers Analysis
Alternatively, the Illinois General Assembly should enact another
statute to limit liability in a way that is tailored to avoid any separation
of powers challenges similar to those in Best and Lebron.3 12 This
would be a difficult task, but the urgency of the problem requires that
the General Assembly take any action that will reduce the cost of
medical malpractice liability and slow down the health care crisis. 313
The court's continued support for the holding in Unzicker suggests that
the most promising drafting technique would be to enact another limit
on liability that applies in a manner similar to the statute in that case. 314
Using this precedent, the General Assembly could at the very least
enact a statute that makes defendants only severally liable for a
plaintiffs injuries regardless of how much they contributed to those
injuries. 315 Broadening several liability would effectively decrease the
expressed through their representatives who enacted the cap); Dean Olsen, State Health Plan
Bothers Official, STATE J.-REG., Jan. 14, 2008, at 15 (quoting Dr. Rodney Osborn, who said that
the Illinois Supreme Court should consider public opinion regarding skyrocketing medical
liability insurance rates). A 1994 public opinion poll by Voter/Consumer Research of Bethesda,
Maryland showed that 92% of Illinois voters believe that frivolous lawsuits have caused higher
medical costs and 94% of voters believe that those lawsuits directly cost them in higher insurance
premiums. Ray Quintanilla, Group Again Seeks Limits on Lawsuits, CHI. TRIB., July 26, 1994, at
3.
311. See supra note 310 and accompanying text (describing the overwhelming support for
damage caps); supra note 18 (describing how damage caps would benefit the public welfare).
312. See Goldhaber & Grycz, supra note 94, at 21 (describing the political discussion that
took place among Republicans and Democrats in the Illinois General Assembly after the Lebron
decision). Members of the legislature have already proposed a number of bills-including a
constitutional amendment-to address the health care crisis. Id.
313. See Act of Aug. 25, 2005, § 101, Pub. Act 94-677, 2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4964-65
(discussing the urgency of the health care crisis), invalidatedby Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp.,
930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010); Goldhaber & Grycz, supra note 94, at 21 (describing the flurry of
legislative activity and debate in the wake of Lebron trying to find solutions to the health care
crisis).
314. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1042-43 (Ill. 2002).
315. This statute would be distinguishable from the statute in Unzicker because it would hold
defendants severally liable no matter what percentage they contributed to the injury. See
Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1042. (holding that the General Assembly has the authority to limit a
defendant's liability based on his contribution). Although this statute could be applied solely to
noneconomic damages, it should apply to all damages so that defendants are only forced to pay
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amount of damages paid by medical professionals and health care
providers. 316 However, any legislation abolishing joint and several
liability state would have to be applied generally and could not
exclusively address medical malpractice cases. 317 Otherwise, the court
would likely invalidate the statute for being special legislation as it did
in Best when it struck down a provision abolishing joint and several
liability for all cases of death, bodily injury, and property damage
except those involving medical malpractice. 318 So long as the
legislature is mindful of this holding, several liability would effectively
slow down the growth of liability costs.
Many argue that the cost savings from these types of tort reform
would just be hoarded by insurance companies so that doctors continue
paying high insurance premiums and the public interest is not
promoted. 3 19 Indeed, health care costs have continued to rise even in

damages for which they are actually liable. See infra note 325 and accompanying text (arguing
that defendants should only be liable for injuries that they cause).
316. Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on
Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 628, 647-49

(1988) (stating that several liability lowers the amount of damages plaintiffs can actually recover
to the amount for which solvent defendants are actually liable). Opponents to several liability
have argued that when defendants expect to pay out less in damages, they merely take less
precaution, which ultimately leads to greater likelihood of injury. Id. at 647-49 (citing Comment,
The Case of the DisappearingDefendant:An Economic Analysis, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 145, 166-67
(1983)). However, this effect is significantly limited by defendants' aversion to incurring any
liability at all. Id. Moreover, the level of care is economically efficient when a defendant is held
liable only for the damages that he causes because he will not be forced to take additional
precaution for the possibility of being held liable for the torts. of others. Id. Therefore,
eliminating joint liability would reduce the cost to the health care system of duplicative
precautionary measures. Id.
317. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1084-89 (Ill. 1997) (invalidating the
abolition of joint and several liability in cases of death, bodily injury, and property damage except
those involving medical malpractice because it was special legislation that uniquely preferred
medical malpractice plaintiffs). The statute at issue in Best replaced joint and several liability
with proportionate several liability for all cases of death, bodily injury, and property damage. Id
at 1084-85. However, the statute reversed this abolition for medical malpractice cases in the
event that the damage cap in the legislation was found unconstitutional. Id. Because the court
did so, it also found the exception for medical malpractice cases unconstitutional as special
legislation. Id at 1088-89. Notably, although the court found that treating medical malpractice
uniquely made the statute special legislation, it did not imply that the statute would have
otherwise been special legislation for applying only in cases of death, bodily injury, and property
damage even though it acknowledged this aspect of the statute before considering the
constitutionality of the medical malpractice exception. See generally id.
318. Id. at 1084-89.
319. Jaclyn Edgar, Comment, Doctor v. Attorney: Why are Attorneys and Injured Patients
Being Blamedfor the Rising Costs of Healthcare?Instead of Tort Reform, Why Medical Reform
is a BetterSolution, 73 UMKC L. REv. 773, 789 (2005).
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states that have tort reform. 320 However, some studies show that states
with damage caps have seen medical liability insurance costs increase at
a lower rate than states without similar reforms. 32 1 In addition, health
care practitioners are more available in states with caps on damages. 322
These trends are clearly beneficial and support the proposition that
broader use of several liability would improve the quality of health care
in Illinois. 323
Further, several liability is more equitable; although it is unjust for an
injured plaintiff to go without compensation, insolvent defendants are
Allocating liability based on
responsible for this injustice. 324
responsibility apportions the risk to the truly negligent and away from
careful hospitals or non-negligent physicians, which typically absorb
these costs before passing them on to the public through the increasing
cost of care. 325 Internalizing liability costs up to the amount for which
an individual is liable more accurately coincides with the deterrence and
justice objectives of tort law because a defendant should not be held
liable for the torts of another. 326
The General Assembly should also consider passing a statutory cap
on damages in medical malpractice cases that can be waived by the
judiciary. 327 Concerns over the separation of powers and other
320. Id. at 786-90. Edgar argues that the median medical liability insurance premium in
states that have capped damages has actually increased at a higher rate than in states without caps
on damages. Id at 788 (citing Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical
MalpracticeLiability Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L.

REv. 417,461 (2004)); see also supra note 8 (describing the argument that there is no correlation
between damage caps and decreasing health care costs).
321. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing to several studies that showed lower
medical malpractice liability insurance rates in states that had caps on damages). But see
Cathleen B. Tumulty, Capping Non-Economic Damages: Is It Really What the Doctor Ordered?
Predictingthe Effect ofFederal Tort Reform by Examining the Impact of Tort Reform at the State

Level, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REy. 817, 818 (2006) (suggesting that there is evidence supporting both
opponents and proponents of damage caps).
322. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing to several studies that showed higher
per capita rates of physicians in states that have caps on damages).
323. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (arguing that several liability would decrease
the costs incurred by health care providers).
324. See Manzer, supra note 316, at 645 (arguing that the legal system does not and cannot
guarantee plaintiffs will have a solvent defendant from which to recover damages and that the
legal system does not shift a defendant's liability to a non-party when only one defendant exists).
325. Id.at644-46,651.
326. Id at 651.
327. Gfell, supra note 247, at 798-99. This policy alternative has been advocated by scholars
and was even included in a 1993 congressional proposal. Id. (citing Patricia J. Chupkovich,
Comment, Statutory Caps: An Involuntary Contribution to the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for Obtaining Affordable Healthcare?, 9 J. CONTEMP.
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constitutional challenges would be minimized when the court can
decide whether or not to apply the cap to a particular case. 328 Yet, the
cap would lower damage awards in medical malpractice cases if it were
crafted so that the waiver was used sparingly. 329 For instance, the
statute might permit a court to award damages in excess of the statutory
limitation "if, upon good cause shown, the court determines that the
present value of past and future economic damages would exceed such
limitation and that the application of such limitation would be
unfair." 330 Even if the courts over-utilize such a waiver provision, the
mere existence of a damage cap would guide juries as to what amount
of damages is sustainable for the health care system. 331 This is
important because damage awards have increased drastically in recent
years as juries have struggled to determine what amount of damages is
reasonable and have focused narrowly on the facts of the case before
them without considering the broader implications of their award. 332
Swelling jury awards are threatening the quality and affordability of
the Illinois health care system, and the general public overwhelmingly
supports damage caps to combat this trend. Even if Illinois is unable to
pass a constitutional amendment to permit legislative caps on damages,
the General Assembly must enact legislation to reduce liability that
would likely survive constitutional scrutiny as outlined above.

HEALTH L. & POL'Y 337, 371-75 (1993)) (arguing in favor of the Healthcare Liability Reform
and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1992, which provided for a national liability cap that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services had discretion to waive).
328. Id.
329. Chupkovich, supra note 327, at 372.
330. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2011). Although this statute applies to economic
damages, it could be modified according to the desire of the Illinois General Assembly. The
legislature might also enact a stricter waiver provision. For example, the statute could prevent the
court from waiving the damage cap except when applying the cap would be a gross miscarriage
of justice. Both of these examples would at least be stricter than the one written by the U.S.
House of Representatives in the Healthcare Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement
Act of 1992, H.R. 3037, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991), which allowed the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to waive a damage cap "for good cause." Id. § 204(a). A stricter waiver
provision would increase the likelihood of invalidation for violating the separation of powers, but
leaving the final determination with the judiciary would nonetheless decrease that likelihood.
Gfell, supra note 247, at 798-99. See Chupkovich, supra note 327, at 371-73 for a more indepth discussion of the Healthcare Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of
1992 and the implications of its waiver provision.
331. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 746 (arguing that consistency is very difficult to achieve
when there are no guiding principles to determine damages).
332. Chupkovich, supra note 327, at 341 (citing David Burda, AHA Offers Solutions to
Malpractice Crisis,HOSPITALS, May 5, 1986, at 53); see also Mulliken v. Lewis, 615 N.E.2d 25,

26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that the jury should have considered public policy interests).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, the Illinois Supreme Court

reinforced the separation of powers analysis from Best v. Taylor
Machine Works. Although the Best analysis was non-binding judicial
dicta, Lebron firmly held that statutory damage caps in medical
malpractice cases violate the separation of powers clause in the Illinois
Constitution. The court held that caps on jury awards of damages
function as a legislative remittitur and that remittitur is an inherent
function of the judiciary. However, legislative caps on jury awards are
prospective policy determinations that apply in all cases, whereas
remittitur is inherently a case-by-case determination as to whether a
jury's award of damages is excessive. Although both actions lower
damages, they function differently and serve different purposes-one
legislative, the other judicial. Moreover, remittitur is not an inherent
power of the judiciary; rather, the judiciary's constitutional authority to
remit jury awards of damages has constantly been questioned by the
courts and scholars as an unconstitutional violation of the jury's power
to determine damages. Therefore, the Lebron court erred in finding that
remittitur was an inherent power of the judiciary and that the 2005 cap
infringed on that power. The countless state and federal holdings that
rejected Best support this conclusion.
In light of the presumption favoring the constitutionality of statutes,
the legislature's authority to change or eliminate the common law, and
the fact that Best's separation of powers analysis was merely judicial
dicta, Lebron's application of Best was shocking. Further, despite the
Lebron holding, Illinois should strive to enact other limits to liability.
First, the people of Illinois should pass a constitutional amendment
giving the General Assembly authority to enact caps on jury awards of
damages. Alternatively, the General Assembly should enact other
statutes that would limit liability while avoiding constitutional
challenges. This could be accomplished by both a damage cap that the
courts could waive and an expansion of several liability.
Illinois is in the midst of a health care crisis whereby costs are
increasing and availability of health care providers is decreasing.
Surging damage awards in medical malpractice cases are contributing to
this crisis, and taking action to reverse or limit Lebron's impact will
help slow it down.

